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I.	  	  INTRODUCTION:	  THE	  IMPACT	  OF	  STOLEN	  IT	  ON	  COMPETITION	  Almost	  a	  century	  ago,	  the	  United	  States	  Supreme	  Court	  declared	  that	  the	  prohibition	  against	  unfair	  competition	  serves	  to	  protect	  fundamental	  values	  and	   important	  rights.	   	   “[T]he	  right	  to	  acquire	  property	  by	  honest	  labor	  or	  the	  conduct	  of	  a	  lawful	  business	  is	  as	  much	  entitled	  to	  protection	  as	   the	   right	   to	   guard	   property	   already	   acquired.	   	   It	   is	   this	   right	   that	  furnishes	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  jurisdiction	  .	  .	  .	  of	  unfair	  competition.”1	  	  The	  idea	  is	  simple:	   it	   is	  unfair	   to	  competitors	  and	   inconsistent	  with	  basic	  notions	  of	   market	   competition	   to	   allow	   market	   actors	   to	   steal	   the	   work	   or	  property	  of	  another	  and	  use	  that	  asset	  to	  obtain	  a	  competitive	  advantage	  over	  companies	  that	  play	  by	  the	  rules.2	   	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  settings,	  however,	   where	   current	   legal	   recourse	   is	   insufficient3	   to	   address	   such	  misconduct;	  particularly	  when	   the	   item	  taken	   is	   information	   technology	  (IT).	  The	  idea	  that	  a	  competitor	  can	  steal	  and	  benefit	  from	  the	  property	  of	  a	   rival	   or	   other	   company	   for	   commercial	   gain	   is	   at	   odds	   with	   basic	  notions	   of	   efficiency	   and	   fair	   play.4	   	   Professor	  Glen	  Robinson	   states	   the	  matter	   precisely:	   “Our	   concept	   of	   competition	   is	   based	   on	   a	   regime	   of	  exclusive	  property	   rights	  .	  .	  .	  Competitors	  are	   supposed	   to	  compete	  with	  their	  own	  property,	  not	  with	  the	  assets	  of	  their	  competitors.”5	  	  Robinson	  cites	   the	   “common	   law	  doctrine	  of	   ‘unfair	   competition,’	  which	  prohibits	  firms	   from	   helping	   themselves	   to	   a	   competitor’s	   property.”6	   	   Although	  Robinson	   focuses	   on	   a	   company’s	   theft	   of	   a	   competitor’s	   property,	   the	  competitive	  harm	  is	  similar	  even	  where	  the	  stolen	  property	  belongs	  to	  a	  third	   party,	   since	   the	   recipient	   of	   the	   stolen	   property	   still	   obtains	   an	  advantage	  over	  its	  competitors	  by	  means	  of	  an	  illegal	  act.	  	  This	  is	  as	  true	  with	  IT	  as	  it	  is	  with	  any	  other	  valuable	  asset,	  and	  raises	  the	  basic	  question	  that	  is	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  research:	  What	  are	  the	  benefits	  and	  challenges	  of	  the	   legal	   remedies	   designed	   to	   address	   the	   significant	   problem	   of	   IT	  
 1. 	   Int’l	   News	   Serv.	   v.	   Associated	   Press,	   248	   U.S.	   215,	   236–37	   (1918);	   Id.	   at	   239–40	  (holding	  that	  stealing	  information	  from	  the	  bulletin	  postings	  of	  a	  competitor	  is	  an	  act	  of	  unfair	  competition)	  (citation	  omitted).	  	  2. 	  RESTATEMENT	  (THIRD)	  OF	  UNFAIR	  COMPETITION	  §	  38	  cmt.	  b	  (1995)	  (endorsing	  a	  remedy	  against	   an	   “unethical”	   competitor	   who	   profits	   from	   the	   highly	   valuable	   initial	   labor	   and	  investment	  of	  another	  but	  does	  not	  pay	  for	  that	  benefit).	  3. 	   See,	   e.g.,	   Intermountain	   Broad.	   &	   Television	   Corp.	   v.	   Idaho	  Microwave,	   Inc.,	   196	   F.	  Supp.	   315,	   323,	   328,	   352	   (D.	   Idaho	   1961)	   (holding	   that	   plaintiffs	   should	   “make	   a	   case	   for	  protection	   under	   copyright	   law,	   statutory	   or	   common	   law,”	   instead	   of	   common	   law	  misappropriation).	  4. 	   Glen	   O.	   Robinson,	  On	   Refusing	   to	   Deal	   with	   Rivals,	   87	   CORNELL	   L.	   REV.	   1177,	   1191	  (2002).	  5. 	  Id.	  6. 	  Id.	  at	  1191–92.	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theft?	  One	   approach	   to	   IT	   theft	  might,	   in	   appropriate	   circumstances,	   be	   to	  consider	  such	  misconduct	  a	  form	  of	  unfair	  competition	  or	  an	  unfair	  trade	  practice.7	   	   In	   the	   common	   sense	   understanding	   of	   the	   phrase,	   such	  practices	   are	   misappropriations8	   that	   might	   not	   always	   be	   actionable	  under	   conventional	   intellectual	  property	   regimes,	  particularly	  when	   the	  misappropriation	   occurs	   outside	   the	   territory	   of	   the	   regulating	  jurisdiction.9	   	   Moreover,	   intellectual	   property	   laws	   are	   designed	   to	  protect	   intellectual	   property	   owners;	   for	   the	   most	   part,	   no	   redress	   is	  provided	   for	   third	   parties	   suffering	   an	   independent	   competitive	   harm.	  	  To	   be	   blunt,	   beneficiaries	   of	   the	   theft	   of	   IT	   secure	   an	   unjustified	   cost	  savings	  over	  their	  competitors	  and	  are	  unjustly	  enriched.10	  If	  a	  manufacturer	  steals	  software	  or	  other	  IT	  instead	  of	  paying	  for	  it,	  its	   input	   costs	   are	   reduced	   as	   compared	   to	   its	   competitors	   that	   pay	   for	  their	   IT.	   	   In	   cases	   where	   the	   company	   using	   stolen	   IT	   is	   a	   contract	  manufacturer,	  that	  cost	  advantage	  may	  accrue,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  to	  the	  firm	  that	  hired	   the	  company	   to	  manufacture	   the	  goods	  on	   its	  behalf	   (i.e.,	   the	  “hiring	  firm”).	  	  The	  result	  is	  an	  uneven	  playing	  field,	  rewarding	  theft	  and	  penalizing	   those	   who	   respect	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   and	   pay	   for	   their	  information	  technology	  and	  other	  key	  inputs.	  These	   indirect,	   yet	   undoubtedly	   damaging	   effects	   of	   IT	   theft	   have	  recently	  been	  the	  target	  of	  attention	  by	  numerous	  state	  attorneys	  general	  and	   state	   legislatures.	   	   Over	   the	   past	   two	   years,	  Washington	   State	   and	  Louisiana	   have	   enacted	   laws	   specifically	   designed	   to	   address	   the	  competitive	   harms	   arising	   from	   the	   use	   of	   stolen	   IT	   by	  manufacturers.	  	  These	  statutes,	  discussed	  in	  the	  body	  of	   the	  article,	  authorize	  the	  state’s	  attorney	  general	  (and	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Washington,	  injured	  manufacturers)	  to	   obtain	   redress	   for	   competitive	   harms.11	   	   More	   recently,	   attorneys	  
 7. 	   Paul	   B.	   Stephan,	   Sheriff	   or	   Prisoner?	   The	   United	   States	   and	   the	   World	   Trade	  
Organization,	   1	   CHI.	   J.	   INT’L	   L.	   49,	   59	   (2000)	   (“The	   government	   needs	   to	   know	   about	  misbehavior	   by	   importers,	   such	   as	   theft	   of	   intellectual	   property	   or	   other	   unfair	   trade	  practices.”).	  8. 	  See	  Intermountain,	  196	  F.	  Supp.	  at	  323–28	  (stating	  that	  the	  remedy	  for	  such	  theft	  may	  lie	  in	  copyright	  or	  other	  common	  law	  claims	  but	  not	  in	  the	  common	  law	  of	  misappropriation.).	  9. 	  On	  common	  law	  misappropriation,	  see	  Edmund	  J.	  Sease,	  Misappropriation	  is	  Seventy-­‐
Five	  Years	  Old;	  Should	  We	  Bury	  It	  or	  Revive	  It?,	  70	  N.	  D.	  L.	  REV.	  781	  (1994);	  Note,	  Nothing	  But	  
Internet,	   110	   HARV.	   L.	   REV.	   1143	   (1997);	   Leo	   J.	   Raskind,	  The	  Misappropriation	   Doctrine	   as	   a	  
Competitive	  Norm	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  Law,	  75	  MINN.	  L.	  REV.	  875,	  882	  (1991).	  10. 	   For	   a	   discussion	   of	   unjust	   enrichment,	   see	   Peter	   Birks,	   Unjust	   Enrichment	   and	  
Wrongful	  Enrichment,	  79	  TEX.	  L.	  REV.	  1767	  (2001).	  11. 	   2011	   Wash.	   Legis.	   Serv.	   Ch.	   98	   (West)	   (codified	   at	   WASH.	   REV.	   CODE	  ANN.	  §§	  19.330.010–19.330.100	  (West	  2012);	  2010	  La.	  Sess.	  Law	  Serv.	  Act	  74	  (West)	  (codified	  at	  LA.	  REV.	  STAT.	  ANN.	  §	  51:1427	  (2012)).	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general	   from	   thirty-­‐six	   states	   and	   three	   U.S.	   territories	   issued	   a	   letter	  urging	  the	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission	  (FTC)	  to	  attack	  this	  problem	  under	  §	  5	  of	  the	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission	  Act	  (FTCA),	  and	  commit	  to	  explore	  remedies	   within	   their	   respective	   state	   laws.12	   	   These	   developments	  signify	  a	  heightened	  awareness	  among	   lawmakers	  and	   law	  enforcement	  authorities	  of	   the	  close	   linkage	  between	  respect	   for	  property	  rights,	   fair	  competition,	  innovation,	  and	  economic	  growth	  in	  the	  global	  economy.	  The	  values	  at	  stake	  are	  significant.	   	   In	  recent	  years,	   the	  reduction	  of	  tariffs	   and	   dismantling	   of	   trade	   barriers	   created	   opportunities	   for	  businesses,	  but	  pressured	  manufacturers	  to	  become	  more	  productive,	  in	  part	   by	   forcing	   manufacturers	   to	   invest	   in	   sophisticated	   IT	   systems	   to	  increase	  profitability,	  with	  the	  hope	  that	   these	  expenditures	  will	  pay	  off	  through	  increased	  efficiencies.	  Where,	   however,	   firms	   steal	   IT	   in	   order	   to	   gain	   a	   cost	   advantage,	  merit-­‐based	   success	   in	   the	  marketplace	   is	   at	   risk	   and	   the	  motivation	   to	  create	   better	   and	  more	   efficient	   goods	   and	   services	   is	   in	   jeopardy.	   	   As	  Professor	  Robinson	   notes,	   “[a]n	   incentives	   problem	   is	   created	   any	   time	  one	  firm	  is	  permitted	  to	  free-­‐ride	  on	  a	  competitor’s	  investments,	  whether	  those	   investments	   are	   represented	   by	   tangible	   assets	   or	   intellectual	  property.”13	   	   That	   formulation	   captures	  many	   of	   the	   legal,	   competitive,	  and	  ethical	  problems	  considered	  in	  this	  Article.14	  Stolen	   IT	   is	   a	   global	   problem	   producing	   massive	   costs	   and	   other	  severe	  economic	  impacts.	  	  The	  estimated	  value	  of	  stolen	  software	  around	  the	  world	   in	   2009	  was	   $51.4	   billion.15	   	   In	   2010,	   it	   was	   $58.8	   billion,	   a	  fourteen	   percent	   increase.16	   	   Moreover,	   “the	   global	   PC	   software	   piracy	  rate	   rose	   in	  2009	   to	   forty-­‐three	  percent,	  up	   two	  percentage	  points	  over	  the	   previous	   year.	   This	   means	   that	   for	   every	   $100	   worth	   of	   legitimate	  software	   sold	   in	   2009,	   an	   additional	   seventy-­‐five	   dollars	   worth	   of	  
 12. 	  Letter	  from	  the	  Nat’l	  Ass’n	  of	  Att’ys.	  Gen.	  to	  the	  Fed.	  Trade	  Comm’n	  (Nov.	  4,	  2011),	  http://www.naag.org/assets/files/pdf/signons/FTCA%20Enforcement%20Final.PDF.	  	  13. 	  Robinson,	  supra	  note	  4,	  at	  1210.	  	  14. 	  Miguel	  Deutch,	  Unfair	  Competition	  and	  the	  “Misappropriation	  Doctrine”—A	  Renewed	  
Analysis,	   48	   ST.	   LOUIS	   U.	   L.J.	   503,	   512	   (2004)	   (“It	   is	   almost	   a	   tautology	   to	   state	   that	   unfair	  competition	   is	  morally	   improper.	   	   ‘Unfair’	  means	   valueless.”);	   see	   19	  U.S.C.	   §	  1677(b)	   (1988)	  (“antidumping”	  legislation	  addressing	  when	  a	  foreign	  competitor’s	  domestic	  price	  was	  “fair”	  or	  if	   the	   competitor	   was	   “dumping”	   the	   item	   in	   the	   U.S.	   market	   and	   thus	   securing	   an	   undue	  competitive	  advantage).	  15. 	  SEVENTH	  ANNUAL	  BSA/IDC	  GLOBAL	  SOFTWARE	  09	  PIRACY	  STUDY	  (EXEC.	  SUMMARY)	  (May	  2010);	   see	   also	   Stephen	   E.	   Siwek,	   THE	   TRUE	   COST	   OF	   COPYRIGHT	   INDUSTRY	   PIRACY	   TO	   THE	   U.S.	  
ECONOMY,	   INST.	   FOR	   POL'Y	   INNOVATION	   (2007),	  http://www.ipi.org/docLib/20120515_CopyrightPiracy.pdf	  (discussing	  studies	  showing	  a	  $58	  billion	  loss	  from	  IP	  piracy).	  16. 	  EIGHTH	  ANNUAL	  BSA	  GLOBAL	  SOFTWARE	  2010	  PIRACY	  STUDY	  1	  (May	  2011).	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unlicensed	  software	  also	  made	  its	  way	  into	  the	  market.”17	  Although	   a	   sizable	   amount	   of	   IT	   theft	   is	   the	   result	   of	   actions	   by	  criminal	   organizations,	   most	   is	   conventional	   unauthorized	   copying—piracy—by	  individuals	  and	  commercial	  entities.18	  	  In	  a	  survey	  conducted	  in	   emerging	   markets,	   fifty-­‐one	   percent	   of	   the	   respondents	   (individuals	  and	  businesses)	  stated	   that	   they	   thought	   it	  was	   lawful	   to	  pirate	  or	  copy	  software.19	  	  Further	  compounding	  the	  problem	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  rate	  of	  IT	  theft	  is	  highest	  in	  some	  of	  the	  same	  countries	  that	  today	  account	  for	  a	  large	   share	   of	   global	   manufacturing.20	   	   The	   National	   Association	   of	  Attorneys	  General	  notes	  that	  software	  piracy	  rates	  in	  some	  of	  America’s	  largest	  trading	  partners	  exceeds	  eighty	  to	  ninety	  percent.21	  It	   has	   become	   evident	   that	   “[c]ompanies	   that	   do	   not	   pay	   for	   the	  [software]	  programs	  they	  use	  to	  run	  their	  operations	  have	  an	  unfair	  cost	  advantage	  over	   companies	   that	  do,	  which	   skews	  competition.”22	   	  As	   the	  Organisation	  for	  Economic	  Co-­‐operation	  and	  Development	  (OECD)	  report	  notes:	  Counterfeiting	  and	  piracy	  have	  economy-­‐wide	  effects:	   (i)	   innovation	  is	   undermined,	   (ii)	   criminal	   networks	   gain	   financially,	   (iii)	   the	  environment	  is	  negatively	  affected,	  (iv)	  workers	  are	  worse	  off.	  	  Moreover,	  in	   countries	  where	   counterfeiting	   and	   piracy	   is	  widespread,	   (v)	   foreign	  direct	   investment	  may	   be	   lower	   and	   (vi)	   the	   structure	   of	   trade	  may	   be	  affected.23	  Rights	   holders	   experience:	   (i)	   lower	   sales	   volume	   and	   prices;	   (ii)	  
 17. 	   SEVENTH	   ANNUAL	   BSA/IDC	   STUDY,	   supra	   note	   15.	   	   For	   comparison,	   a	   2004	   study	  showed	   the	   value	   of	   all	   counterfeited	   and	   pirated	   goods,	   internationally,	   to	   be	   €500	   billion.	  	  COMM’N	   ON	   INTELLECTUAL	   PROP.,	   INT’L	   CHAMBER	   OF	   COM,	   THE	   FIGHT	   AGAINST	   PIRACY	   AND	  COUNTERFEITING	  OF	  INTELLECTUAL	  PROPERTY	  DOC.	  NO.	  450/986	  (June	  7,	  2004).	  See	  generally	  ORG.	  FOR	   ECON.	   CO-­‐OPERATION	   AND	   DEV.,	   THE	   ECONOMIC	   IMPACT	   OF	   COUNTERFEITING	   AND	   PIRACY	   (EXEC.	  SUMMARY)	  (2007),	  http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/12/38707619.pdf	  [hereinafter	  OECD].	  18. 	   Chun-­‐Hsien	   Chen,	   Explaining	   Different	   Enforcement	   Rates	   of	   Intellectual	   Property	  
Protection	   in	   the	  United	   States,	   Taiwan,	   and	   the	   People's	   Republic	   of	   China,	   10	   TUL.	   J.	   TECH.	  &	  INTELL.	  PROP.	  211,	  215–16	  (2007)	  (discussing	  comparatively	  the	  culture	  of	  copying	  in	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Asia);	  Daniel	  C.K.	  Chow,	  Why	  China	  Does	  Not	  Take	  Commercial	  Piracy	  Seriously,	  32	  OHIO	  N.U.	  L.	  REV.	  203,	  213	  (2006).	  	  It	   is	   no	   exaggeration	   to	   say	   that	  many	   in	   China	   believe	   that	   they	   can	   engage	   in	   the	  theft	   of	   intellectual	   property	   with	   impunity.	   	   This	   creates	   a	   widespread	   business	  culture	   that	   tolerates,	   or	   even	   encourages,	   unauthorized	   copying	   and	   theft	   of	  intellectual	  property.	  	  The	  culture	  of	  copying	  is	  so	  pervasive	  that	  even	  many	  of	  China’s	  most	  successful	  legitimate	  companies	  treat	  it	  as	  a	  part	  of	  doing	  business.	  
Id.	  	   19. 	  EIGHTH	  ANNUAL	  BSA	  STUDY,	  supra	  note	  16,	  at	  2.	  20. 	  Id.	  21. 	  Letter	  from	  the	  Nat’l	  Ass’n	  of	  Att’ys.	  Gen.	  to	  the	  Fed.	  Trade	  Comm’n,	  supra	  note	  12.	  22. 	  EIGHTH	  ANNUAL	  BSA	  STUDY,	  supra	  note	  16,	  at	  4.	  23. 	  OECD,	  supra	  note	  17,	  at	  17.	  
32	   MARQ.	  INTELL.	  PROP.	  L.	  REV.	   [Vol.	  17:1	  
	  
damaged	  brand	  value	  and	   firm	  reputation;	   (iii)	   lower	  royalties,	   (iv)	   less	  incentive	   to	   invest	   in	   new	   products	   and	   processes,	   (v)	   higher	   costs,	  because	  of	  spending	  on	  efforts	   to	  combat	  counterfeiting	  and	  piracy,	  and	  (vi)	  potential	  reduction	  in	  the	  scope	  of	  their	  operations.24	  Consumers	   acquiring	   counterfeit	   or	   pirated	   products,	   whether	  knowingly	   or	   unknowingly,	   (i)	   may	   be	   exposed	   to	   elevated	   health	   and	  safety	   risks,	   and	   (ii)	   could	   experience	   lower	   consumer	   utility	   due	   to	  generally	  lower	  quality	  of	  infringing	  products.25	  Effects	  of	  counterfeiting	  and	  piracy	  on	  government	  come	  in	  the	  form	  of	   (i)	   lower	   tax	   revenues,	   (ii)	   the	   cost	   of	   anti-­‐counterfeiting	   activities,	  including	   responding	   to	  public	  health	   and	   safety	   consequences	   and	   (iii)	  corruption.26	  While	  most	  studies	  on	  IT	  theft	  have	  focused	  on	  the	  direct	  harms	  to	  IT	  owners	   and	   to	   governments	   due	   to	   reduced	   private-­‐sector	   investment	  and	   lower	   tax	   revenues,	   little	   attention	   has	   been	   paid	   to	   the	   indirect	  harms	  that	  IT	  theft	  may	  impose	  on	  competitors	  who	  incur	  the	  full	  costs	  of	  any	   IT	   they	  use.	   	  Often,	   these	   competitive	  harms	  are	  hidden	  by	   the	   fact	  that	  the	  victims	  have	  no	  idea	  that	  their	  competitors	  are	  breaking	  the	  law	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  a	  competitive	  edge.	  II.	  	  ADDRESSING	  IT	  THEFT	  UNDER	  EXISTING	  LEGAL	  REGIMES	  Given	   the	  economic	   impact	  of	   IT	   theft,	   including	   its	  potential	   impact	  on	   competition,	   it	   is	   worth	   exploring	   whether	   this	   problem	   can	   be	  addressed	   under	   existing	   legal	   regimes	   such	   as	   the	   FTCA,	   state	   unfair	  competition	  laws,	  and	  international	  trade	  law.	  
A.	  	  	   Federal	  Trade	  Commission	  Act	  Section	  5	  of	   the	  FTCA	  gives	  the	  agency	  power	  to	   issue	  rules,	  publish	  guidelines,	   and	   initiate	   enforcement	   proceedings	   to	   address	   “unfair	  methods	   of	   competition”	   and	   “unfair	   or	   deceptive	   acts	   or	   practices.”27	  	  The	  FTC	  should	  exercise	  that	  power	  to	  address	  IT	  theft.28	  In	   empowering	   the	   FTC	   to	   act	   against	   “unfair	   methods	   of	  competition,”	   Congress	   gave	   the	   agency	   broad	   and	   flexible	   authority	   to	  
 24. 	  Id.	  at	  18.	  25. 	  Id.	  at	  19.	  26. 	  Id.	  at	  20.	  27. 	  15	  U.S.C.	  §	  45	  (2006)	  (referred	  to	  as	  §	  5	  of	   the	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission	  Act	  and	  embodies	  both	  consumer	  protection	  and	  unfair	  competition	  authority).	  28. 	  15	  U.S.C.	  §	  45	  (2006),	   referred	   to	  as	  §	  5	  of	   the	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission	  Act	  and	  embodies	  both	  consumer	  protection	  and	  unfair	  competition	  authority.	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ensure	   the	   fairness	   of	   the	   competitive	   process.29	   	   In	   recognition	   of	   the	  expanse	  of	   this	   authority,	   some	  years	   ago,	   the	   Supreme	  Court	   held	   that	  the	   FTC	   is	   authorized	   to	   “consider[]	   public	   values	   beyond	   simply	   those	  enshrined	   in	   the	   letter	   or	   encompassed	   in	   the	   spirit	   of	   the	   antitrust	  laws.”30	   	   In	   1989,	   James	   F.	   Mongoven	   (a	   senior	   lawyer	   at	   the	   FTC)	  described	  the	  expanse	  of	  §	  5	  of	  the	  FTCA	  as	  follows:	  Section	   5	   reaches	   some	   classes	   of	   behavior	   beyond	   those	  prohibited	   by	   the	   Sherman	   and	   Clayton	   Acts.	   	   Section	   5	   also	  condemns	  business	  torts—that	  is,	  actions	  that	  injure	  a	  competitor	  through	   reasons	   other	   than	   competition	   on	   the	   merits,	   or	   a	  superior	   ability	   to	   satisfy	   consumer	   demands.	   	   The	   legislative	  history	   of	   the	   FTC	   Act	   contains	   specific	   references	   to	   false	  disparagement,	  stock	  manipulation,	  industrial	  espionage,	  and	  “the	  hiring	   of	   detectives”	   as	   among	   the	   practices	   that	   the	   new	  commission	  would	  halt.	   	   It	  seems	  reasonable	  to	  treat	   the	  theft	  of	  intellectual	   property	   as	   having	   a	   familial	   resemblance	   to	   these	  other	  torts.31	  The	  FTC	   can	  use	   its	   substantial	   regulatory	  power	   if	   an	  unfair	   act	   or	  practice	   “causes	   or	   is	   likely	   to	   cause	   substantial	   injury	   to	   consumers	  which	   is	   not	   reasonably	   avoidable	   by	   consumers	   themselves	   and	   not	  outweighed	   by	   countervailing	   benefits	   to	   consumers	   or	   competition.”32	  	  
 29. 	   The	   Senate	   report	   explains	   that	   Congress	   left	   it	   to	   the	   FTC	   “to	   determine	   what	  practices	  were	  unfair”	  because	  “there	  were	  too	  many	  unfair	  practices	  to	  define,	  and	  after	  20	  of	  them	  into	  law	  it	  would	  be	  quite	  possible	  to	  invent	  others.”	  	  S.	  REP.	  NO.	  63-­‐567,	  at	  13	  (1914);	  see	  
also	  H.R.	  REP.	  NO.	  63-­‐1142,	  at	  19	  (1914)	  (“There	  is	  no	  limit	  to	  human	  inventiveness	  in	  this	  field	  .	  .	   .	   .	   If	  Congress	  were	  to	  adopt	  the	  method	  of	  definition,	   it	  would	  undertake	  an	  endless	  task.”);	  Senate	  Consideration	  of	  H.R.	  15,613,	  S.	  4160	  (Remarks	  of	  Sen.	  Newlands)	  (noting	  “it	  would	  be	  utterly	   impossible	   for	   Congress	   to	   define	   the	   numerous	   practices	   which	   constitute	   unfair	  competition	  and	  which	  are	  against	  good	  morals	   in	  trade”);	   id.	   (noting	  that	  unfair	  competition	  “covers	  every	  practice	  and	  method	  between	  competitors	  upon	  the	  part	  of	  one	  against	  the	  other	  that	   is	   against	   public	  morals	   .	   .	   .	   or	   is	   an	   offense	   for	  which	   a	   remedy	   lies	   either	   at	   law	  or	   in	  equity”).	  30. 	   See	   FTC	   v.	   Sperry	  &	  Hutchinson,	   405	  U.S.	   233,	   244	   (1972)	   (“[T]he	   Federal	   Trade	  Commission	  does	  not	  arrogate	  excessive	  power	  to	  itself	  if,	  in	  measuring	  a	  practice	  against	  the	  elusive,	  but	  congressionally	  mandated	  standard	  of	  fairness,	  it,	  like	  a	  court	  of	  equity,	  considers	  public	  values	  beyond	  simply	  those	  enshrined	  in	  the	  letter	  or	  encompassed	  in	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  antitrust	  laws.”);	  FTC	  v.	  Indiana.	  Fed’n	  of	  Dentists,	  476	  U.S.	  447,	  454–55	  (1986)	  (“The	  standard	  of	   ‘unfairness’	   under	   the	   FTC	   Act	   is,	   by	   necessity,	   an	   elusive	   one,	   encompassing	   not	   only	  practices	  that	  violate	  the	  Sherman	  Act	  and	  the	  other	  antitrust	  laws,	  but	  also	  practices	  that	  the	  Commission	  determines	  are	  against	  public	  policy	  for	  other	  reasons.”)	  (citation	  omitted).	  31. 	  James	  F.	  Mongoven,	  The	  International	  Theft	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  as	  a	  Violation	  of	  
Section	   5	   of	   the	   Federal	   Trade	   Commission	   Act,	   19	   J.	   REPRINTS	   ANTITRUST	   L.	   &	   ECON.	   471,	   503	  (1989)	  (footnote	  omitted).	  32. 	  15	  U.S.C.	  §	  45(n).	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For	   example,	   in	   In	   re	   C	   &	   D	   Electronics,	   the	   Commission	   used	   its	  unfairness	   authority	   to	   address	   the	   sale	   of	   devices	   that	   permitted	  unauthorized	   viewing	   of	   cable	   TV	   signals.33	   	   In	   a	   separate	   statement,	  Chairman	  Daniel	  Oliver	  noted	  that	  consumers	  were	  harmed	  because	  “the	  activity	   here	   may	   provide	   disincentives	   that	   will	   result	   in	   services	   not	  being	   available	   to	   consumers	   at	   all.”34	   	   Chairman	  Oliver	  was	   concerned	  that	  the	  respondents’	  actions	  would	  “undermine	  the	  competitive	  process	  that	  encourages	  innovation	  or	  maintenance	  of	  [cable]	  facilities”	  and	  raise	  the	  prices	  paid	  by	  law-­‐abiding	  cable	  subscribers.35	  Both	   the	  FTC’s	   competition	   jurisdiction	  and	   its	   consumer	  protection	  jurisdiction	  serve	   the	  same	  end:	  namely,	  protecting	  consumer	  welfare.36	  	  Manufacturers’	   use	   of	   stolen	   IT	  distorts	   the	  marketplace	   and	  ultimately	  harms	   consumers.	   	   The	   FTCA	   anticipates	   agency	   action	   directed	   at	  “ethical	   notions	   of	   fairness	   and	   marketplace	   morality	  .	  .	  .	   [as	   well	   as]	  enforcement	  [based	  on]	  economic	  criteria	  defin[ing]	  unscrupulous	  acts	  in	  terms	  of	  consumer	   injury.”37	   	  The	  theft	  of	   IT	  by	  manufacturers	  certainly	  raises	  questions	  of	  fairness,	  marketplace	  morality,	  and	  unscrupulous	  acts	  that	   have	   a	   demonstrable	   and,	   in	   the	   long	   run,	   negative	   effect	   on	   the	  marketplace.38	  Large-­‐scale	   theft	   of	   information	   technology,	   particularly	   by	  manufacturers	  from	  countries	  where	  IT	  theft	  is	  rampant,39	  will,	  over	  any	  
 33. 	  In	  re	  C	  &	  D	  Electronics,	  109	  F.T.C.	  72	  (1987).	  34. 	  Id.	  at	  80.	  35. 	  Id.	  There	   is	   little	  or	  no	  reason	  for	  businesses	  to	  establish	  cable	  services,	  or	  expand	  and	  improve	   existing	   ones,	   unless	   sufficient	   revenue	   can	   be	   generated	   to	   warrant	  expenditures.	   	  Widespread	  or	  unchecked	   free	   riding	  could	  discourage	  ventures	   that	  would	  offer	  such	  services	  or	  could	  result	  in	  raising	  the	  prices	  for	  cable	  subscriptions	  in	  existing	  networks	  beyond	  optimal	  levels.	  36. 	  See,	  e.g.,	  Timothy	  J.	  Muris,	  Chairman,	  Fed.	  Trade	  Comm’n,	  Prepared	  Remarks	  at	  the	  Fordham	   Corporate	   Law	   Institute’s	   Twenty-­‐Ninth	   Annual	   Conference	   on	   International	  Antitrust	   Law	   and	   Policy:	   The	   Interface	   of	   Competition	   and	   Consumer	   Protection	   (Oct.	   31,	  2002)	   (available	   at	   http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/021031fordham.pdf)	   (“[W]ell-­‐conceived	  competition	  policy	  and	  consumer	  protection	  policy	  take	  complementary	  paths	  to	  the	  destination	  of	  promoting	  consumer	  welfare.”).	  37. 	  Marc	  A.	  Rodwin,	  Consumer	  Protection	  and	  Managed	  Care:	   Issues,	  Reform	  Proposals,	  
and	  Trade-­‐Offs,	  32	  HOUS.	  L.	  REV.	  1319,	  1364	  (1996)	  (footnotes	  omitted).	  38. 	  See	  Letter	  from	  the	  Nat’l	  Ass’n	  of	  Att’ys.	  Gen.	  to	  the	  Fed.	  Trade	  Comm’n,	  supra	  note	  12	  (“Competition	  is	  unfairly	  distorted	  .	  .	  .	  when	  a	  manufacturer	  gains	  a	  cost	  advantage	  by	  using	  stolen	  information	  technology,	  whether	  in	  its	  business	  operations	  or	  manufacturing	  processes.	  	  It	  offends	  our	  sense	  of	  fairness	  when	  such	  wrongdoers	  reap	  a	  commercial	  advantage	  from	  their	  illegal	  acts.”).	  39. 	  The	  jurisdictional	  difficulties	  associated	  with	  IT	  theft	  outside	  the	  United	  States	  are	  not	  unlike	  the	  issues	  associated	  with	  the	  domestic	  sale	  of	  defective	  goods	  produced	  by	  foreign	  manufacturers.	  	  Andrew	  F.	  Popper,	  The	  Two	  Trillion	  Dollar	  Carve-­‐Out:	  Foreign	  Manufacturers	  of	  
Defective	  Goods	  and	  the	  Death	  of	  H.R.	  4678	  in	  the	  111th	  Congress,	  26	  TOXICS	  L.	  REP.	  105	  (2011)	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extended	   period	   of	   time,	   erode	   the	   ability	   of	   U.S.	   manufacturers	   to	  compete,	  and	  will	  undermine	  their	  incentives	  to	  produce	  better	  and	  more	  efficient	  goods	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  Consumers	  may	  not	  be	   immediately	  harmed	  by	  such	   thefts.	   	   Indeed,	  the	  immediate	  impact	  is	  that	  consumers	  might	  see	  more	  firms	  supplying	  goods	  to	  certain	  markets.	  	  But	  if	  these	  thefts	  stifle	  incentives	  to	  invest	  in	  new	  technology,	  then	  consumers	  will	  inevitably	  suffer	  in	  the	  long	  run	  as	  economic	  growth	  rates	  decline.40	  The	   result	  of	   IT	   theft	   is	   the	  potential	   loss	  of	   countless	   jobs,41	   loss	  of	  billions	  in	  revenues,	  and	  importantly,	  long-­‐term	  market	  disincentives	  for	  U.S.	  manufacturers,	  creators	  and	  inventors.	  If	  consumers	  believe	  a	  product	  was	  manufactured	  by	  a	  company	  that	  respects	   property	   rights—whether	   based	   on	   a	   company’s	   code	   of	  conduct,	  participation	  in	  a	  trade	  association	  that	  demands	  lawful	  conduct	  by	   participants,	   or	   other	   public	   statements	   by	   a	  manufacturer—yet	   the	  company	  knowingly	  uses	  stolen	  IT,	  a	  deception	  has	  occurred	  that	  might	  violate	   the	   FTCA.	   	   For	   deceptive	   practices,	   the	   agency	   is	   authorized	   to	  take	  action	  if	  it	  can	  “establish	  that	  (1)	  there	  was	  a	  representation;	  (2)	  the	  representation	  was	   likely	  to	  mislead	  customers	  acting	  reasonably	  under	  the	  circumstances,	  and	  (3)	  the	  representation	  was	  material.”42	  The	  FTC	  may	   seek	   sanctions	   (either	   through	  agency	  proceedings	  or,	  in	   some	   instances	   in	   federal	   court)	   against	   “persons,	   partnerships,	   or	  corporations	  .	  .	  .	   using	   unfair	   methods	   of	   competition	   or	   unfair	   or	  deceptive	   acts	   or	   practices	   in	   or	   affecting	   commerce.”43	   	   Under	   its	  competition	   jurisdiction,	   the	  FTC	  may	   take	   steps	   to	   address	   “commerce	  with	   foreign	   nations”	   if	   the	   activity	   has	   “a	   direct,	   substantial,	   and	  reasonably	   foreseeable	   effect”	   on	  U.S.	   commerce.44	   	  Under	   its	   consumer	  protection	   jurisdiction,	   the	  Commission	   is	  authorized	   to	  address	  acts	  or	  practices	   involving	   foreign	   commerce	   that	   “cause	   or	   are	   likely	   to	   cause	  
 (noting	  that	  all	  too	  often,	  foreign	  manufacturers	  who	  produce	  defective	  goods	  are	  outside	  the	  reach	  of	  U.S.	  courts	  and	  can	  inflict	  significant	  harms	  on	  U.S.	  citizens	  and	  businesses	  with	  limited	  or	  no	  consequences).	  40. 	  Mongoven,	  supra	  note	  31,	  at	  499.	  41. 	  Letter	  from	  the	  Nat’l	  Ass’n	  of	  Att’ys.	  Gen.	  to	  the	  Fed.	  Trade	  Comm’n,	  supra	  note	  12,	  (“Some	  2.04	  million	  jobs	  across	  the	  U.S.	  have	  been	  replaced	  by	  manufacturing	  in	  China,	  India,	  Mexico	  and	  Russia.”).	  42. 	  FTC	  v.	  Tashman,	  318	  F.3d	  1273,	  1277	  (11th	  Cir.	  2003)	  (citations	  omitted);	  see	  FTC	  v.	  Direct	  Mktg.	  Concepts,	  Inc.,	  569	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  285,	  297	  (D.	  Mass.	  2008).	  	  43. 	   Andrew	  Serwin,	  The	   Federal	   Trade	   Commission	   and	  Privacy:	  Defining	  Enforcement	  
and	   Encouraging	   the	   Adoption	   of	   Best	   Practices,	   48	   SAN	   DIEGO	   L.	   REV.	   809,	   821	   (2011).	  (footnotes	  omitted).	  44. 	  15	  U.S.C.	  §	  45(a)(3)(A)	  (2006).	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reasonably	   foreseeable	   injury	  within	   the	  United	   States.”45	   	   The	   FTC	  has	  broad	   remedial	   powers	   “including	   restitution	   to	   domestic	   or	   foreign	  victims”46	  and	  “injunctive	  relief	  in	  the	  form	  of	  ‘cease	  and	  desist’	  orders.”47	  	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  theft	  of	  IT	  or	  other	  non-­‐tangible	  assets,	  the	  power	  of	   the	   FTC	   to	   act	   to	   address	   anticompetitive,	   unfair,	   and	   deceptive	  practices	   is	  present.	   	  Recognizing	   that	   the	  exercise	  of	   sanction	  power	   is	  vested	  generally	  to	  the	  discretion	  of	  an	  agency,48	  the	  consumer	  deception	  and	   market	   distortion	   that	   occur	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   theft	   of	   IT	   justify	  consideration	  of	  agency	  action	  in	  this	  area.	  
B.	  	  	   State	  Unfair	  Competition	  Laws	  Many	   states	   have	   unfair	   trade	   practices	   or	   consumer	   protection	  statutes	  modeled	  after	  the	  FTCA.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  North	  Carolina	  statute	  tracks	   the	  FTCA	  by	  declaring	  unlawful	   “[u]nfair	  methods	  of	  competition	  in	  or	  affecting	  commerce,	  and	  unfair	  or	  deceptive	  acts	  or	  practices	   in	  or	  affecting	  commerce.”49	   	  Chapter	  93A	  of	  the	  Massachusetts	  laws	  similarly	  prohibits	   “[u]nfair	  methods	   of	   competition	   and	  unfair	   or	   deceptive	   acts	  or	   practices	   in	   the	   conduct	   of	   any	   trade	   or	   commerce.”50	   	   California	  creates	   a	   cause	   of	   action	   against	   anyone	   who	   engages	   in	   “unfair	  competition,”	   broadly	   defined	   to	   include	   “any	   unlawful,	   unfair	   or	  fraudulent	  business	  act	  or	  practice.”51	   	   Iowa	  and	  Missouri	  both	  prohibit	  “unfair	  practices”	  along	  with	  a	  variety	  of	  deceptive	  acts.52	  
 45. 	  Id.	  §	  45(a)(4)(A)(i).	   	  For	  example,	  the	  FTC	  has	  taken	  action	  against	  U.S.	  companies	  for	   misrepresenting	   that	   their	   overseas	   manufacturers	   used	   environmentally	   friendly	  processes.	  	  In	  one	  case,	  the	  defendants’	  website	  claimed,	  “[Jonäno	  creats	  (sic)]	  eco-­‐Kashmere®	  in	   Asia	   in	   accordance	   with	   ISO	   1400	   environmental	   standards”	   and	   touted	   Jonäno’s	   use	   of	  organic	   bamboo,	   the	   testing	   conducted	   by	   authorized	   labs	   and	   professional	   certification	  groups,	   and	   certification	   to	   ISO	   and	   OKO-­‐TEK	   standards.	   	   According	   to	   the	   FTC,	   these	  statements	  were	  deceptive	  because	   the	  process	  used	   to	  manufacture	   rayon	  actually	   involves	  hazardous	   chemicals	   and	   releases	   air	   pollutants.	   	   See	   Complaint	   at	   3–4	   Exhibits,	   In	   re	   Sami	  Designs,	   LLC	   d/b/a/	   Jonäno,	   No.	   C-­‐4279	   -­‐	   (Dec.	   18,	   2009)	   (available	   at	  http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0823194/091218samicmpt.pdf;	  http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0823194/090811samiexha-­‐d.pdf).	  	  46. 	  15	  U.S.C.	  §	  	  45(a)(4)(B	  (2011).	  47. 	  Elbert	  L.	  Robertson,	  A	  Corrective	  Justice	  Theory	  of	  Antitrust	  Regulation,	  49	  CATH.	  U.	  L.	  REV.	  741,	  750	  (2000).	  48. 	  Heckler	  v.	  Chaney,	  470	  U.S.	  821,	  826	  (1985)	  (In	  most	  instances,	  agency	  enforcement	  decisions	  are	  “committed	  to	  agency	  discretion	  by	  law.”)	  (citation	  omitted).	  49. 	  N.C.	  GEN.	  STAT.	  	  ANN.	  §	  75-­‐1.1(a)	  (West	  2011).	  50. 	  MASS.	  GEN.	  LAWS	  ANN.	  ch.	  93A,	  §	  2	  (West	  2011).	  	  	  51. 	  CAL.	  BUS.	  &	  PROF.	  CODE	  §	  17200	  (2010).	  	  	  52. 	   IOWA	  CODE	  ANN.	  §	  714.16(2)(a)	  (West	  2010)	  (declaring	  unlawful:	  “[T]he	  act,	  use	  or	  employment	  by	  a	  person	  of	  an	  unfair	  practice,	  deception,	   fraud,	   false	  pretense,	   false	  promise,	  or	   misrepresentation,	   or	   the	   concealment,	   suppression,	   or	   omission	   of	   a	   material	   fact	   with	  intent	  that	  others	  rely	  upon	  the	  concealment,	  suppression,	  or	  omission,	  in	  connection	  with	  the	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State	  unfair	  trade	  laws	  protect	  consumers	  and	  competitors53	  and	  level	  the	  playing	  field,	  giving	  competitors	  who	  play	  by	  the	  rules	  an	  equal	  shot	  at	  benefitting	   from	  their	   labor	  and	   investment	  as	  opposed	  to	   those	  who	  cream-­‐skim	   or	   free-­‐ride	   on	   the	   efforts	   of	   others.	   	   These	   laws	   are	  predicated,	   inter	   alia,	   on	   the	   overriding	   importance	   of	  merit,	   efficiency,	  creativity,	  and	  competitive	  rigor	  in	  any	  market.	  	  “[O]ne	  who	  has	  used	  his	  intellectual,	  physical,	  or	  financial	  powers	  to	  create	  a	  commercial	  product	  should	   be	   afforded	   judicial	   relief	   from	   a	   competitor	  who	   seeks	   to	   ‘reap	  where	  he	  has	  not	  sown.’”54	  	  The	  idea	  of	  such	  laws	  is	  to	  achieve	  a	  fair	  and	  robust	   competitive	   market	   in	   which	   similarly	   situated	   participants	  compete	  based	  on	  optimal	  efficiency	  and	  proficiency.55	  The	  key	  feature	  of	  most	  of	  these	  laws	  is	  that	  those	  who	  engage	  in	  an	  “unfair”	   act	   can	   be	   penalized.	   	   The	   type	   of	   claim	   that	   can	   be	   initiated,	  however,	   is	   determined	   by	   each	   state’s	   definition	   of	   unfair	   act.	   	   States	  often	   do	   not	   define	   clearly	   the	   scope	   of	   unfair	   acts,	   leaving	   courts	   to	  decide	  which	  acts	  confer	  an	  unfair	  advantage	  in	  business	  relations.56	  Because	  the	  case	  law	  has	  developed	  differently	  in	  each	  state,	  attempts	  to	   bring	   claims	   based	   on	   manufacturers’	   unfair	   use	   of	   stolen	   IT	   face	  considerable	   legal	   uncertainty.	   	   For	   example,	   in	  Massachusetts,	   Chapter	  93A	  claims	  can	  arise	  from	  a	  competitor’s	  theft	  and	  misappropriation	  that	  result	  in	  an	  unfair	  business	  advantage.57	  	  In	  Iowa,	  by	  contrast,	  the	  existing	  
 lease,	   sale,	   or	   advertisement	  of	   any	  merchandise”);	  MO.	  ANN.	   STAT.	  §	  407.020(1)	   (West	  2011)	  (declaring	  unlawful:	  “The	  act,	  use	  or	  employment	  by	  any	  person	  of	  any	  deception,	  fraud,	  false	  pretense,	  false	  promise,	  misrepresentation,	  unfair	  practice	  or	  the	  concealment,	  suppression,	  or	  omission	  of	  any	  material	  fact	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  sale	  or	  advertisement	  of	  any	  merchandise	  in	  trade	  or	  commerce”).	  	  	  53. 	  Johnson	  v.	  City	  of	  Pleasanton,	  982	  F.2d	  350	  (9th	  Cir.	  1992).	  54. 	  Rudolf	  Callmann,	  He	  Who	  Reaps	  Where	  He	  Has	  Not	  Sown:	  Unjust	  Enrichment	   in	  the	  
Law	  of	  Unfair	  Competition,	  55	  HARV.	  L.	  REV.	  595,	  612	  (1942).	  	  55. 	   Deutch	   supra	   note	   14,	   at	   545,	   (raising	   the	   “free-­‐rider”	   problem	   in	   the	   context	   of	  economic	  efficiency	  and	  misappropriation).	  56. 	  See,	   e.g.,	  United	  Labs.,	   Inc.	  v.	  Kuykendall,	  403	  S.E.2d	  104,	  109	   (N.C.	  Ct.	  App.	  1991)	  (“No	   precise	   definition	   of	   ‘unfair	   methods	   of	   competition’	   as	   used	   in	   [§	  75-­‐1.1]	   exists	   	   .	   .	   .	  ‘Rather,	  the	  fair	  or	  unfair	  nature	  of	  particular	  conduct	  is	  to	  be	  judged	  by	  viewing	  it	  against	  the	  background	   of	   actual	   human	   experience	   and	   by	   determining	   its	   intended	   and	   actual	   effects	  upon	  others.’”	  (quoting	  McDonald	  v.	  Scarboro,	  370	  S.E.2d	  680,	  684	  (N.C.	  Ct.	  App.	  1988)));	  see	  
also	   JUDICIARY	   COMM.,	   WASH.	   H.R.,	   H.B.	   1495	   BILL	   ANALYSIS	   (2011),	   available	   at	  http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2011-­‐12/Pdf/Bill%20Reports/House/1495%20HBA%20JUDI%2011.pdf	   (reasoning	   that:	   “The	  state’s	   Consumer	   Protection	   Act	   (CPA)	   prohibits	   unfair	   or	   deceptive	   acts	   or	   practices	   and	  unfair	  methods	  of	  competition	  in	  the	  conduct	  of	  trade	  or	  commerce	  that	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  affect	  the	  people	  of	  Washington.	   	  Several	  statutes	  specify	  practices	  that	  constitute	  unfair	  acts,	  but	   they	   do	   not	   provide	   an	   exhaustive	   list.	   	   A	   court	   may	   find	   that	   conduct	   not	   specifically	  enumerated	  in	  statute	  may	  constitute	  an	  unfair	  or	  deceptive	  act.”).	  57. 	   See	   Datacomm	   Interface,	   Inc.	   v.	   Computerworld,	   Inc.,	   489	  N.E.2d	   185,	   197	   (Mass.	  1986)	   (competitor’s	   misrepresentation	   regarding	   its	   possession	   of	   a	   conversion	   copy	   of	   a	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precedent	   is	   thin	   and	   does	   not	   provide	   any	   examples	   of	   actions	   arising	  out	  of	  distortions	  to	  the	  competitive	  process.	   	  Because	  Iowa	  courts	  have	  recognized	   that	   the	   prohibition	   on	   “unfair	   practices”	   should	   be	  interpreted	  in	  a	  broad	  and	  flexible	  way,	  there	  is	  a	  legal	  basis	  to	  argue	  that	  a	   manufacturer’s	   use	   of	   stolen	   IT	   should	   be	   actionable	   as	   an	   unfair	  practice.58	   	   The	   sparseness	   of	   the	   case	   law	  means	   that	   this	  would	   be	   a	  novel	  argument	  under	  the	  Iowa	  statute.	  The	   state	   unfair	   trade	   practices	   laws	   are	   also	   subject	   to	   certain	  limitations,	  such	  as	  jurisdiction-­‐specific	  restrictions	  on	  who	  has	  standing	  to	  enforce	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  law.	  	  In	  Iowa,	  only	  the	  state	  attorney	  general	  (AG)	  may	  bring	  a	  case;	  the	  Iowa	  Consumer	  Fraud	  Act	  does	  not	  include	  a	  private	  right	  of	  action.59	  	  Texas	  limits	  private	  plaintiffs	  to	  a	  narrow	  set	  of	  claims:	  private	  plaintiffs	  can	  bring	  claims	  based	  only	  on	  the	  specific	  acts	  enumerated	   in	   the	   statute,	  whereas	   the	   Texas	   AG	   is	   authorized	   to	   take	  action	  against	  all	  “false,	  misleading,	  or	  deceptive	  acts	  or	  practices.”60	   	  To	  satisfy	   the	   standing	   requirements	   under	   California’s	   unfair	   competition	  law,	   a	   private	   plaintiff:	   “must	  .	  .	  .	   (1)	   establish	   a	   loss	   or	   deprivation	   of	  money	   or	   property	   sufficient	   to	   qualify	   as	   injury	   in	   fact,	   i.e.,	   economic	  
injury,	   and	   (2)	   show	   that	   that	   economic	   injury	   was	   the	   result	   of,	   i.e.,	  
caused	   by,	   the	   unfair	   business	   practice	   or	   false	   advertising	   that	   is	   the	  gravamen	  of	  the	  claim.”61	  There	   may	   also	   be	   state-­‐specific	   limitations	   on	   the	   relief	   afforded	  under	   the	   statute.	   	   For	   example,	   there	   is	   a	  wide	   range	  of	   civil	   penalties	  that	  can	  be	  assessed	  against	  entities	  found	  to	  have	  engaged	  in	  unfair	  acts.	  	  Missouri	  caps	  civil	  penalties	  at	  $1000	  per	  violation.62	  	  In	  Iowa,	  courts	  can	  impose	   a	   penalty	   of	   up	   to	   $40,000	   per	   violation.63	   	   Similarly,	   although	  almost	   all	   state	   unfair	   trade	   statutes	   authorize	   equitable	   relief,	   the	  
 circulation	  list	  purchased	  by	  plaintiff’s	  parent	  in	  foreclosure	  violated	  Chapter	  93A);	  Lee	  v.	  Mt.	  Ivy	  Press,	  L.P.,	  827	  N.E.2d	  727	  (Mass.	  App.	  Ct.	  2005)	  (upholding	  judgment	  for	  plaintiff’s	  Chapter	  93A	   claims	   predicated	   upon	   defendant	   fraudulently	   inducing	   plaintiff	   to	   sign	   away	   her	  copyright	  and	  profits	  from	  book).	  58. 	  See	  State	  ex	  rel.	  Miller	  v.	  Cutty’s	  Des	  Moines	  Camping	  Club,	  Inc.,	  694	  N.W.2d	  518,	  526	  (Iowa	  2005).	  What	   is	   an	   “unfair	   practice”?	   	   On	   its	   face	   the	   term	   is	   dizzying	   in	   its	   generality.	  	  Guidance	  can	  be	  found,	  however,	  in	  the	  decisions	  of	  other	  courts.	  	  These	  courts	  have	  determined	   statutes	   that	   prohibit	   “unfair	   practices”	   are	   designed	   to	   infuse	   flexible	  equitable	   principles	   into	   consumer	   protection	   law	   so	   that	   it	   may	   respond	   to	   the	  myriad	  of	  unscrupulous	  business	  practices	  modern	  consumers	  face.	  	  
Id.	   59. 	  See	  generally	  IOWA	  CODE	  §	  714.16.	  	  	  60. 	  See	  TEX.	  BUS.	  &	  COM.	  CODE	  ANN.	  §	  17.46(a)–(b),	  (d)	  (West	  2007).	  	  	  61. 	  Kwikset	  Corp.	  v.	  Superior	  Court,	  246	  P.3d	  877,	  885	  (Cal.	  2011).	  	  62. 	  MO.	  ANN.	  STAT.	  §	  407.100(6)	  (West	  2011).	  63. 	  IOWA	  CODE	  ANN.	  §	  714.16(7)	  (West	  2010).	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territorial	   scope	   of	   any	   injunction	   could	   vary.	   	   Naturally,	   once	   a	   court	  obtains	   personal	   jurisdiction	   over	   a	   defendant,	   it	   has	   power	   to	   enjoin	  activities	   outside	   the	   state.64	   	   However,	   courts	   may	   decline	   to	   exercise	  this	  power	  for	  comity	  reasons	  or	  for	  fear	  of	  offending	  the	  policy	  of	  other	  states,	   particularly	   if	   it	   is	   unclear	  whether	   the	   conduct	  would	   be	   illegal	  under	   the	   other	   states’	   laws.65	   	   Because	   not	   all	   states	   prohibit	   “unfair”	  acts,66	   	   courts	  may	  decide	   to	   limit	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   injunction	   so	   that	   it	  only	  applies	  within	  its	  own	  state.	  Independent	   of	   the	   unfair	   trade	   statutes,	   some	   states	   recognize	   a	  separate	   common	   law	   tort	   of	   unfair	   competition.	   	   However,	   what	  constitutes	  a	  tortious	  act	  of	  “unfair	  competition”	  varies	  from	  jurisdiction	  to	  jurisdiction.	  	  For	  example,	  a	  few	  states	  confine	  “unfair	  competition”	  to	  its	   historical	   roots	   in	   claims	   involving	   the	   “palming	  off”	   of	   goods	  or	   the	  misappropriation	   of	   a	   competitor’s	   labor	   or	   expenditures.67	   	   In	   other	  states,	   the	   concept	   of	   unfair	   competition	   has	   evolved	   to	   include	   “all	  statutory	   and	   non-­‐statutory	   causes	   of	   action	   arising	   out	   of	   business	  conduct	   which	   [sic]	   is	   contrary	   to	   honest	   practice	   in	   industrial	   or	  commercial	  matters.”68	  	  In	  states	  recognizing	  a	  broader	  concept	  of	  unfair	  competition,	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  commercial	  torts	  may	  fall	  under	  that	  general	  designation.	  	  These	  include	  the	  torts	  of	  business	  defamation,	  trade	  secret	  misappropriation,	   tortious	   interference	   with	   contract	   or	   prospective	  advantage,	   and	   similar	   conduct	   that	   harms	   competitors.	   	   Because	   the	  
 64. 	  See	  RESTATEMENT	  (SECOND)	  OF	  CONFLICT	  OF	  LAWS	  §	  53	  (1971)	  (“A	  state	  has	  power	  to	  exercise	  judicial	  jurisdiction	  to	  order	  a	  person,	  who	  is	  subject	  to	  its	  judicial	  jurisdiction,	  to	  do	  an	  act,	  or	  to	  refrain	  from	  doing	  an	  act,	  in	  another	  state.”).	  	  	  	  65. 	  Cf.	  RESTATEMENT	  (THIRD)	  OF	  UNFAIR	  COMPETITION	  §	  48,	  cmt.	  c	  (1995).	  The	  issuance	  of	  an	  injunction	  under	  state	  law	  prohibiting	  otherwise	  lawful	  conduct	  in	  another	  state	  raises	  serious	  concerns.	  	  Thus,	  although	  a	  court	  may	  have	  jurisdiction	  to	  grant	  broader	  relief,	  an	   injunction	  protecting	  the	  right	  of	  publicity	  should	  ordinarily	  be	  limited	  to	  conduct	  in	  jurisdictions	  that	  provide	  protection	  comparable	  to	  the	  forum	  state.	  	  	  
Id.	  	  	   66. 	   A	   number	   of	   state	   statutes	   prohibit	   deception	   but	   not	   unfairness.	   	   For	   example,	  section	  349	  of	  New	  York’s	  General	  Business	  Law	  prohibits	  “[d]eceptive	  acts	  or	  practices	  in	  the	  conduct	   of	   any	   business,	   trade	   or	   commerce.”	   N.Y.	   GEN.	   BUS.	   LAW	  §	  349(a)	   (McKinney	   2004).	  	  The	  New	  York	  legislature	  chose	  not	  to	   import	  the	  FTCA’s	  prohibition	  on	  “[u]nfair	  methods	  of	  competition”	  and	   “unfair	   .	   .	   .	   acts	  or	  practices,”	   an	  omission	   that	  one	   federal	   court	  has	   found	  significant.	   	   See	   Leider	   v.	   Ralfe,	   387	   F.	   Supp.	   2d	   283,	   295	   (S.D.N.Y.	   2005)	   (“[T]his	   omission	  indicates	   that	   anticompetitive	   conduct	   that	   is	   not	   premised	   on	   consumer	   deception	   is	   not	  within	  the	  ambit	  of	  the	  statute.”).	  	  	  67. 	  See,	  e.g.,	  Kenney	  v.	  Hanger	  Prosthetics	  &	  Orthotics,	  Inc.,	  269	  S.W.3d	  866,	  871	  (Ky.	  Ct.	  App.	  2007).	  	  68. 	  Am.	  Heritage	  Life	  Ins.	  Co.	  v.	  Heritage	  Life	  Ins.	  Co.,	  494	  F.2d	  3,	  14	  (5th	  Cir.	  1974);	  see	  
also	   Rehab.	   Specialists,	   Inc.	   v.	   Koering,	   404	   N.W.2d	   301,	   305	   (Minn.	   Ct.	   App.	   1987)	   (“Unfair	  competition	  is	  not	  a	  tort	  with	  specific	  elements;	  it	  describes	  a	  general	  category	  of	  torts	  which	  courts	  recognize	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  commercial	  interests.”).	  
40	   MARQ.	  INTELL.	  PROP.	  L.	  REV.	   [Vol.	  17:1	  
	  
scope	  of	   the	  doctrine	  varies	   so	  much	  between	   states,	   it	  may	  be	  difficult	  for	  manufacturers	  to	  obtain	  effective	  relief	  under	  this	  tort	  doctrine.69	  
C.	  	  	   National	  Trade	  Laws	  National	  trade	  laws	  provide	  additional	  possible	  remedies	  against	  the	  use	   of	   stolen	   IT	   by	   manufacturers,	   at	   least	   when	   those	   products	   are	  manufactured	  abroad	  and	  then	  imported	  into	  the	  United	  States.70	  Section	  337	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Tariff	  Act	  of	  1930	  allows	  the	  U.S.	  government	  to	  exclude	  any	  item	  that	  violates	  U.S.	  patent,	  copyright,	  or	  trademark	  laws	  from	   entry	   into	   the	   United	   States.71	   	   Additionally,	   an	   action	   can	   be	  brought	   for	   a	   broad	   variety	   of	   “unfair	   acts,”	   interpreted	   to	   include	  misappropriation	   of	   trade	   secrets,72	   false	   advertising,	   breach	   of	  nondisclosure	   agreements,	   and	   violations	   of	   antitrust	   laws.73	   	   Congress	  has	  stated	  that	  the	  language	  of	  section	  337	  is	  “designed	  to	  cover	  a	  broad	  range	   of	   unfair	   acts.”74	   	   Thus,	   although	   it	   would	   be	   an	   issue	   of	   first	  
 69. 	  There	  are	  causes	  of	  action	   in	   tort	   that,	  at	   first	  blush,	  could	  be	  used	  to	  address	   the	  harms	  caused	  by	  IT	  theft:	  conversion,	  tortious	  interference	  with	  contact,	  or	  misappropriation.	  	  
See,	  e.g.,	  C.	  Owen	  Paepke,	  An	  Economic	  Interpretation	  of	  the	  Misappropriation	  Doctrine:	  Common	  
Law	  Protection	  for	  Investments	   in	  Innovation,	  2	  HIGH	  TECH.	  L.J.	  55,	  56,	  63	  (1987);	  Courtney	  W.	  Franks,	   Comment,	   Analyzing	   the	   Urge	   to	   Merge:	   Conversion	   of	   Intangible	   Property	   and	   the	  
Merger	   Doctrine	   in	   the	   Wake	   of	   Kremen	   v.	   Cohen,	   42	   HOUS.	   L.	   REV.	   489,	   522	   n.233	   (2005)	  (explaining	   that	  Oklahoma,	  Nevada	  and	  Tennessee	  do	  not	   recognize	   conversion	  of	   intangible	  property).	   	  However,	   these	  causes	  of	  action’s	   remedial	  potential	   is	   limited	   to	  direct	  harms	   to	  owners	   and	   not	   to	   the	   market	   or	   competitive	   injuries	   that	   are	   the	   focus	   of	   this	   paper.	  	  Moreover,	   misappropriation	   applies	   only	   in	   those	   situations	   where	   the	   plaintiff	   made	   a	  significant	   investment	   to	   develop	   its	   own	   content.	   	   It	   is	   at	   best	   unclear	   whether	  misappropriation	   could	   be	   stretched	   to	   include	   situations	   where	   the	   rival	   is	   not	   directly	  copying	  or	  exploiting	  the	  plaintiff’s	  own	  content.	  	  Similarly,	  while	  conversion	  might	  be	  available	  for	   the	   IT	   owner	   to	   seek	   relief,	   it	   does	   not	   address	   the	   independent	   harm	   suffered	   by	   a	  competitor.	   	   Finally,	   for	   tortious	   interference	  with	   business	   relationship,	   the	   plaintiff	   would	  need	   to	   prove	   that	   the	   defendant	   interfered	   with	   a	   specific	   current	   or	   future	   business	  relationship,	  an	  extraordinarily	  difficult	  task—if	  not	  impossible—when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  harms	  a	  competitor	  sustains.	   	  See,	  e.g.,	  Kaufmann,	   Inc.	  v.	  Americraft	  Fabrics,	   Inc.,	  232	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  220,	  225	   (S.D.N.Y.	   2002);	   Republic	   Tobacco,	   L.P.	   v.	   N.	   Atlantic	   Trading	   Co.,	   254	   F.	   Supp.	   2d	   1007,	  1011	  (N.D.	  Ill.	  2003)	  (noting	  that	  New	  York,	  Kentucky,	  and	  Illinois	  laws	  regarding	  interference	  claims	  have	  similar	  requirements).	  70. 	  See	  LEE	  BURGUNDER,	  LEGAL	  ASPECTS	  OF	  MANAGING	  TECHNOLOGY	  (West	  3d	  ed.	  2004).	  71. 	  19	  U.S.C.	  §§	  1337(a)(1)(B)–(C),	  (d)	  (2006).	  72. 	   Coamoxiclav	   Prods.,	   Inv.	   No.	   337-­‐TA-­‐479,	   USITC	   Pub.	   2003	  WL	   1793272	   (USITC	  Mar.	  6,	  2003);	  Certain	  Coamoxiclav	  Prods.,	  Inv.	  No.	  337-­‐TA-­‐479US	  USITC	  Pub.	  (Apr.	  16,	  2003)	  (Order),	  http://www.usitc.gov/secretary/fed_reg_notices/337/I0416aa9.PDF.	  73. 	  See	   Robert	  A.	   Caplen,	  Recent	   Trends	  Underscoring	   International	   Trade	   Commission	  
Review	   of	   Initial	   Determinations	   and	   Federal	   Circuit	   Appeals	   from	   Final	   Commission	  
Determinations	  under	  Section	  337	  of	   the	  Tariff	  Act	  of	  1930,	  17	  FORDHAM	  INTELL.	  PROP.	  MEDIA	  &	  ENT.	   L.J.	   337	   (2007)	   (tracking	   how	   Section	   337	   has	   been	   reinvigorated	   by	   rounds	   of	  amendments).	  74. 	  S.	  REP.	  NO.	  100-­‐71at	  128	  (1987).	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impression,	   there	   is	   a	   basis	   to	   believe	   that	   the	   importation	   of	   products	  into	  the	  United	  States	  from	  a	  foreign	  manufacturer	  using	  stolen	  IT	  would	  constitute	  an	  unfair	  act	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  section	  337.75	  Pursuant	   to	   19	   U.S.C.	  §	  1337,	   the	   United	   States	   International	   Trade	  Commission	   (ITC)	   has	   the	   authority	   to	   enforce	   a	   variety	   of	   U.S.	  international	   trade	   laws,	   including	   section	   337.76	   	   The	   ITC	   “is	   an	  independent,	   quasi-­‐judicial	   Federal	   agency	   with	   broad	   investigative	  responsibilities	  on	  matters	  of	  trade.”77	  Section	  337	  actions	  are	  usually,	  but	  not	  always,	   initiated	  by	  affected	  market	  participants.78	  	  Section	  1337(a)(1)(A)	  provides	  in	  relevant	  part:	  (1)	  [T]he	  following	  are	  unlawful	  .	  .	  .	  (A)	   Unfair	   methods	   of	   competition	   and	   unfair	   acts	   in	   the	  importation	  of	  articles	  .	  .	  .	   into	   the	  United	  States,	  or	   in	   the	  sale	  of	  such	  articles	  by	   the	  owner,	   importer,	   or	   consignee,	   the	   threat	  or	  effect	  of	  which	  is—	  (i)	   to	   destroy	   or	   substantially	   injure	   an	   industry	   in	   the	   United	  States.79	  It	   does	   not	   matter	   where	   the	   respondent	   is	   domiciled.	   	   “[T]he	  overwhelming	  majority	  of	  respondents	  were	  domiciled	  in	  Asia,”	  but	  there	  have	   also	   been	   respondents	   “from	   Europe,	   Africa,	   the	   Middle	   East,	   the	  Caribbean,	  Australia	  and	  Oceania,	  and	  the	  Americas.”80	  Upon	   receiving	   a	   complaint,	   the	   ITC	   begins	   an	   investigation	   of	   the	  alleged	   violation.81	   	   The	   ITC	   assigns	   the	   case	   to	   an	   administrative	   law	  judge	   (ALJ),	   although	   section	  337	   actions	   resemble	   civil	   litigation	  more	  
 75. 	  For	  instance,	  the	  Commission	  has	  held	  that	  the	  scope	  of	  §	  337	  is	  “broad	  enough	  to	  prevent	  every	  type	  and	  form	  of	  unfair	  practice.”	  	  Certain	  Welded	  Stainless	  Steel	  Pipe	  and	  Tube,	  Inv.	   No.	   337-­‐TA-­‐29,	   USITC	   Pub.	   863	   (Feb.	   1978),	   Comm’rs	   Feb.	   (emphasis	   added),quoting	   S.	  REP.	  NO.	  595	  at	  3	  (1922	  (1922).	  	  The	  Court	  of	  Customs	  and	  Patent	  Appeals	  (the	  precursor	  to	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  for	  the	  Federal	  Circuit)	  likewise	  has	  stated:	  [T]he	  quoted	  language	  is	  broad	  and	  inclusive	  and	  should	  not	  be	  held	  to	  be	  limited	  to	  acts	   coming	   within	   the	   technical	   definition	   of	   unfair	   methods	   of	   competition	   as	  applied	   in	   some	   decisions.	   	   [I]t	   is	   evident	   from	   the	   language	   used	   that	   Congress	  intended	  to	  allow	  wide	  discretion	  in	  determining	  what	  practices	  are	  to	  be	  regarded	  as	  unfair.	  
In	  re	  Von	  Clemm,	  229	  F.2d	  441,	  443–44	  (C.C.P.A.	  1955).	  76. 	  See	  19	  U.S.C.	  §	  1337	  (2011).	  77. 	  About	  the	  USITC,	  USITC,	  http://www.usitc.gov/press_room/about_usitc.htm.	  78. 	   See	   Caplen,	   supra	   note	   73,	   at	   356	   (explaining	   that	   the	   ITC	   “may	   initiate	  investigations	  ‘upon	  its	  initiative’”)	  (footnote	  omitted).	  79. 	  19	  U.S.C.	  §	  1337(a)(1)(A).	  80. 	  See	  Caplen,	  supra	  note	  73,	  at	  374–75	  (footnotes	  omitted).	  81. 	  19	  U.S.C.	  §	  1337(b).	  
42	   MARQ.	  INTELL.	  PROP.	  L.	  REV.	   [Vol.	  17:1	  
	  
than	  administrative	  proceedings.82	   	  After	  an	   initial	  hearing,	   the	  ALJ	   files	  the	   initial	   determination	   (ID),	   which	   includes	   the	   findings	   of	   fact	   and	  conclusions	  of	  law.	  	  If	  the	  ITC	  does	  not	  order	  review	  of	  the	  ID,	  then	  the	  ID	  becomes	   the	   ITC’s	   determination.83	   	   In	   its	   determination,	   the	   ITC	   may	  issue	  an	  exclusion	  order84	   (enforceable	  by	  U.S.	  Customs)	  or	  a	   cease	  and	  desist	   order.85	   	   This	  method	  of	   ITC	   enforcement	   is	   desirable	   over	   court	  litigation	  for	  at	  least	  four	  reasons:	  it	  offers	  “injunctive-­‐like	  relief	  .	  .	  .	  [it]	  is	  both	   drastic	   and	   swift	  .	  .	  .	   ,	   the	   forum	   is	   generally	   favorable	   to	   U.S.	  industry	  .	  .	  .	   ,	   [and]	   there	   is	  no	  need	   to	  obtain	  personal	   jurisdiction	  over	  foreign	  importers.”86	  ITC	  enforcement	   also	  has	   its	  drawbacks.	   	   For	   example,	   although	   the	  ITC	  is	  authorized	  to	  self-­‐initiate	  proceedings,	  in	  practice,	  it	  rarely	  does	  so.	  	  This	   leaves	  the	  private	  complainant	  with	  the	  costly	  and	  time-­‐consuming	  burden	  of	  proving	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  unfair	  act,	  a	  relationship	  between	  the	   unfair	   act	   and	   the	   imported	   article,	   a	   “domestic	   industry,”	   and	   a	  showing	  that	  the	  domestic	  industry	  has	  been,	  or	  is	  likely	  to	  be,	  injured	  by	  the	   activity.	   	   These	   are	   onerous	   obligations	   guaranteeing	   an	   expensive	  process—and	   one	   where	   there	   are	   no	   money	   damages	   for	   successful	  plaintiffs.	   	   Considering	   these	   drawbacks—and	   given	   the	   volume	   of	   IT	  theft	   referenced	   earlier	   in	   this	   article—it	   is	   safe	   to	   say	   that	   while	   the	  section	   337	   remedy	   is	   of	   value,	   this	   enforcement	   mechanism	   has	   not	  come	   close	   to	   addressing	   the	   core	   problems	   of	   piracy	   and	   economic	  harm.	  	  Finally,	  because	  the	  President	  has	  the	  authority	  to	  modify	  or	  reject	  any	   relief	   granted,	   the	   possibility	   of	   a	   presidential	   veto	   creates	   another	  level	  of	  uncertainty	  for	  potential	  plaintiffs.87	  III.	  	  	  THE	  WASHINGTON	  AND	  LOUISIANA	  STATUTES	  On	   July	   22,	   2011,	  Washington	   State	   adopted	   a	   new	   law	  designed	   to	  target	  the	  harms	  associated	  with	  software,	  and	  other	  forms	  of,	  IT	  theft:88	  
 82. 	  See	  Caplen,	  supra	  note	  73,	  at	  356–57	  (listing	  Section	  337	  proceedings’	  similarities	  to	  a	  civil	  litigation:	  full-­‐scale	  discovery,	  trial-­‐type	  hearings	  with	  due	  process	  safeguards,	  a	  record,	  motions,	  depositions,	   interrogatories,	  requests	  for	  admission,	  and	  applications	  for	  issuance	  of	  subpoenas)	  (footnotes	  omitted).	  83. 	   19	  U.S.C.	   	  §	  1337(j)	   (“If	   the	  Commission	  determines	   that	   there	   is	   a	   violation	   .	   .	   .	   it	  shall—(A)	   publish	   such	   determination	   in	   the	   Federal	   Register,	   and	   (B)	   transmit	   to	   the	  President	  a	  copy	  of	  such	  determination.”	  	  The	  President	  may	  disapprove	  the	  ITC’s	  action	  based	  on	  “policy	  reasons”	  within	  sixty	  days.).	  84. 	  Id.	  §	  1337(e).	  85. 	  Id.	  §	  1337(f).	  86. 	  Jack	  Q.	  Lever,	  Jr.,	  Unfair	  Methods	  of	  Competition	  in	  Import	  Trade:	  Actions	  before	  the	  
International	  Trade	  Commission,	  41	  BUS.	  LAW.	  1165,	  1167	  (1986).	  	  87. 	  Id.	  at	  1168.	  88. 	  WASH.	  REV.	  CODE	  ANN.	  §	  19.330.010	  (2012).	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Any	   person	  who	   manufactures	   an	   article	   or	   product	   while	   using	  
stolen	   or	   misappropriated	   information	   technology	   in	   its	   business	  
operations	   after	   notice	   and	   opportunity	   to	   cure	  .	  .	  .	   is	   deemed	   to	  engage	  in	  an	  unfair	  act	  where	  such	  an	  article	  or	  product	  is	  sold	  or	  offered	  for	  sale	   in	  this	  state,	  either	  separately	  or	  as	  a	  component	  of	  another	  article	  or	  product,	  and	  in	  competition	  with	  an	  article	  or	  product	  sold	  or	  offered	  for	  sale	  in	  this	  state.89	  The	   Washington	   statute	   creates	   a	   new	   cause	   of	   action	   against	  manufacturers	  who	  illegally	  use	  (as	  opposed	  to	  pirate)	  software	  or	  other	  IT	   to	   reduce	   their	   costs	   and	   thus	   compete	   unfairly	   with	   honest	  manufacturers.	   	   In	   limited	   situations,	   the	   Washington	   statute	   also	  imposes	  responsibilities	  on	   firms	   that	   transact	  business	  (or	  “hire”)	  with	  such	   manufacturers	   to	   produce	   products	   on	   their	   behalf	   as	   a	   way	   of	  avoiding	  unfair	  competitive	  harm	  caused	  by	  the	  manufacturers’	  conduct.	  In	   2010,	   Louisiana	   also	  passed	   a	   bill	   to	   address	   situations	  where	   IT	  theft	   distorts	   the	   marketplace.	   	   Modifying	   the	   Louisiana	   Unfair	   Trade	  Practices	   and	   Consumer	   Protection	   Law	   (LUTPA),	   the	   Louisiana	  legislation	  declared	  that:	  “It	  shall	  be	  unlawful	  for	  a	  person	  to	  develop	  or	  manufacture	  a	  product,	  or	  to	  develop	  or	  supply	  a	  service	  using	  stolen	  or	  misappropriated	   property,	   including	   but	   not	   limited	   to	   computer	  software	  that	  does	  not	  have	  the	  necessary	  copyright	  licenses,	  where	  that	  product	   or	   service	   is	   sold	   or	   offered	   for	   sale	   in	   competition	  with	   those	  doing	  business	  in	  this	  state.”90	  A	   violation	   is	   deemed	   “an	   unfair	   method	   of	   competition	   and	   unfair	  practice	  or	  act,”	  and	  is	  subject	  to	  the	  remedies	  and	  penalties	  provided	  for	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  LUTPA.91	  Although	   both	   statutes	   seek	   to	   remedy	   the	   harm	   that	   occurs	   when	  manufacturers	  use	  stolen	  IT	  to	  gain	  an	  unfair	  competitive	  advantage,	  the	  Washington	   statute	   has	   some	   additional	   notable	   features	   discussed	  below.	  
A.	  	  	   Notice	  and	  Opportunity	  to	  Cure	  Under	  the	  Washington	  statute,	  liability	  cannot	  be	  imposed	  on	  either	  a	  manufacturer	  using	  stolen	  IT	  or	  a	  hiring	  firm	  unless	  that	  manufacturer	  or	  hiring	   firm	   has	   been	   given	   advance	   notice	   of	   the	   problem	   and	   an	  opportunity	   to	   rectify	   the	   situation.92	   	   For	   instance,	   section	   50	   of	   the	  
 89. 	  Id.	  §	  19.330.020	  (emphasis	  added).	  90. 	  LA.	  REV.	  STAT.	  ANN.	  §	  51:1427(1)	  (2012).	  91. 	  Id.	  §	  51:1427(2).	  92. 	  WASH.	  REV.	  CODE	  ANN.	  §	  19.330.010	  (2012).	  
44	   MARQ.	  INTELL.	  PROP.	  L.	  REV.	   [Vol.	  17:1	  
	  
statute	  ensures	  that	  manufacturers	  are	  put	  on	  notice	  of	  the	  alleged	  stolen	  IT	  use	  and	  are	  given	  at	  least	  ninety	  days	  to	  rectify	  the	  situation	  before	  a	  complaint	  may	  even	  be	  filed:	  (1)	  No	  action	  may	  be	  brought	  under	  RCW	  19.330.020	  unless	   the	  person	  subject	  to	  RCW	  19.330.020	  received	  written	  notice	  of	   the	  alleged	   use	   of	   the	   stolen	   or	   misappropriated	   information	  technology	   from	   the	   owner	   or	   exclusive	   licensee	   of	   the	  information	  technology	  or	  the	  owner’s	  agent	  and	  the	  person:	  (a)	  Failed	  to	  establish	  that	  its	  use	  of	  the	  information	  technology	  in	  question	  did	  not	  violate	  RCW	  19.330.020;	  or	  (b)	  failed,	  within	  ninety	  days	  after	  receiving	  such	  a	  notice,	  to	  cease	  use	   of	   the	   owner’s	   stolen	   or	   misappropriated	   information	  technology.	  However,	   if	   the	   person	   commences	   and	   thereafter	   proceeds	  diligently	  to	  replace	  the	  information	  technology	  with	  information	  technology	  whose	  use	  would	  not	  violate	  RCW	  19.330.020,	  such	  a	  period	  must	  be	  extended	   for	  an	  additional	  period	  of	  ninety	  days,	  not	   to	   exceed	   one	   hundred	   eighty	   days	   total.	   	   The	   information	  technology	   owner	   or	   the	   owner’s	   agent	   may	   extend	   any	   period	  described	  in	  this	  section.93	  Likewise,	   a	   hiring	   firm	   or	   other	   third	   party	   cannot	   be	   added	   to	   an	  action	  or	   subject	   to	   liability	  unless	   it	   (1)	  was	   served	  with	   a	   copy	  of	   the	  section	  50	  notice	  that	  was	  sent	  to	  the	  manufacturer	  at	   least	  ninety	  days	  prior	   to	   the	   entry	   of	   judgment	   against	   the	  manufacturer	   and	   (2)	   failed,	  within	   180	   days	   of	   receiving	   the	   notice,	   to	   direct	   the	   manufacturer	   to	  cease	   its	   use	   of	   stolen	   IT.94	   	   Thus,	   the	   statute	   ensures	   that	   any	   party	  potentially	  subject	  to	   liability	   is	  on	  notice	  of	   the	  putative	  action	  and	  has	  an	  opportunity	  to	  rectify	  the	  situation	  before	  liability	  may	  be	  imposed.	  
B.	  	  	   Limited	  Monetary	  and	  Injunctive	  Relief	  If	  a	  manufacturer	  refuses	  to	   legalize	   its	   IT	  or	  establish	  that	   its	  use	   is	  legitimate	  after	  receiving	  the	  section	  50	  notice,	  the	  state	  attorney	  general	  may	  file	  suit	  for	  damages	  or	  injunctive	  relief.	  	  An	  injured	  business	  whose	  products	   are	   sold	   in	   Washington	   State	   can	   also	   take	   action	   against	  competitors	   that	   use	   $20,000	   or	   more	   of	   stolen	   IT	   in	   their	   business	  operations,	   provided	   that	   the	  plaintiff	   itself	   does	   not	   use	   stolen	   IT.95	   	   If	  
 93. 	  Id.	  §	  19.330.050(1).	  94. 	  See	  id.	  §§	  19.330.060(2)(a),	  19.330.080(1)(c)(i).	  95. 	  Id.	  §§	  19.330.060(1),	  (5).	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the	   court	   determines	   that	   a	   manufacturer	   violated	   the	   statute,	   it	   may	  order	   the	   manufacturer	   either	   to	   pay	   actual	   damages	   or	   statutory	  damages	   (up	   to	   the	   retail	   price	   of	   the	   stolen	   or	   misappropriated	   IT),	  whichever	   is	   greater.96	   	   If	   the	   court	   determines	   that	   the	   manufacturer	  willfully	  violated	  the	  statute,	  it	  may	  impose	  treble	  damages.97	  The	  statute	  authorizes	  courts,	  under	  limited	  circumstances,	  to	  enjoin	  a	   manufacturer	   from	   further	   violations,	   including	   enjoining	   the	   sale	   of	  products	  in	  Washington	  made	  in	  violation	  of	  the	  statute.98	  	  The	  court	  may	  enjoin	   sales	   only	   if	   the	   manufacturer’s	   violation	   resulted	   in	   at	   least	   a	  three	  percent	   difference	   in	   the	  product’s	   retail	   price	   over	   a	   four-­‐month	  period.99	  	  Preliminary	  injunctive	  relief	  is	  prohibited.100	  The	   statute	   does	   not	   apply	   to	   companies	   providing	   services,	  medicines,	  or	  certain	  copyrightable	  end	  products,	  or	  where	  the	  allegation	  that	   the	   IT	   is	   stolen	   is	   based	   on	   the	   violation	   of	   a	   patent,	  misappropriation	  of	  a	  trade	  secret,	  or	  violation	  of	  the	  terms	  of	  an	  open-­‐source	  license.101	  
C.	  	  	   Recourse	  Against	  Hiring	  Firms	  If	   a	   court	   finds	   a	  manufacturer	   in	   violation	   of	   section	   20,102	   a	   claim	  can	  be	  added	  for	  “actual	  direct	  damages	  against	  a	  third	  party	  who	  sells	  or	  offers	   to	   sell	   in	   this	   state	   products	   made	   by	   that	   person.”103	   	   Damages	  against	  a	  third	  party	  are	  capped	  at	  $250,000	  and	  can	  only	  be	  imposed	  if,	  
inter	   alia,	   the	   section	   20	   violator	   “did	   not	  make	   an	   appearance	   or	   does	  
 96. 	  Id.	  §	  19.330.060(1)(b).	  97. 	  Id.	  §	  19.330.060(4)(a).	  98. 	  Id.	  §	  19.330.060(1)(a).	  99. 	  Id.	  §§	  19.330.020,	  19.330.010(5).	  100. 	  Id.	  §	  19.330.060(6)(a).	  101. 	  See	  id.	  §	  19.330.030.	  102. 	  Section	  20	  states:	  	  Any	   person	   who	   manufactures	   an	   article	   or	   product	   while	   using	   stolen	   or	  misappropriated	   information	   technology	   in	   its	   business	   operations	   after	   notice	   and	  opportunity	   to	   cure	   as	   provided	   in	   RCW	  19.330.050	   and,	  with	   respect	   to	   remedies	  sought	  under	  RCW	  19.330.060(6)	  or	  19.330.070,	  causes	  a	  material	  competitive	  injury	  as	   a	   result	   of	   such	   use	   of	   stolen	   or	   misappropriated	   information	   technology,	   is	  deemed	  to	  engage	  in	  an	  unfair	  act	  where	  such	  an	  article	  or	  product	  is	  sold	  or	  offered	  for	  sale	  in	  this	  state,	  either	  separately	  or	  as	  a	  component	  of	  another	  article	  or	  product,	  and	  in	  competition	  with	  an	  article	  or	  product	  sold	  or	  offered	  for	  sale	  in	  this	  state	  that	  was	  manufactured	  without	  violating	   this	  section.	   	  A	  person	  who	  engages	   in	  such	  an	  unfair	   act,	   and	   any	   articles	   or	   products	  manufactured	   by	   the	   person	   in	   violation	   of	  this	  section,	   is	  subject	  to	  the	   liabilities	  and	  remedial	  provisions	  of	  this	  chapter	   in	  an	  action	  by	  the	  attorney	  general	  or	  any	  person	  described	  in	  RCW	  19.330.060(5),	  except	  as	  provided	  in	  RCW	  19.330.030	  through	  19.330.090.	  103. 	  Id.	  §	  19.330.060(2).	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not	   have	   sufficient	   attachable	   assets	   to	   satisfy	   a	   judgment	   against	   the	  person,”	   and	   “either	   manufactured	   the	   final	   product	   or	   produced	   a	  component	   equal	   to	   thirty	   percent	   or	   more	   of	   the	   value	   of	   the	   final	  product.”104	   	   In	   addition,	   the	   third	   party	  must	   have	   a	   direct	   contractual	  relationship	  with	   the	  section	  20	  violator—i.e.,	   the	   third	  party	  must	  be	  a	  hiring	   firm.105	   	  Other	  businesses	  or	  consumers	   in	  Washington	  State	   that	  purchase	  a	  section	  20	  violator’s	  products	  are	  exempt	  altogether.	  The	   Washington	   statute	   contains	   several	   safe	   harbors	   that	   allow	  hiring	  firms	  to	  avoid	  liability,	  as	  well	  as	  any	  disruptions	  to	  their	  product	  supply	  chain.106	   	  For	  example,	  a	  hiring	  firm	  qualifies	  for	  a	  safe	  harbor	  if:	  (1)	  the	  hiring	  firm	  requires	  its	  contract	  manufacturers	  to	  use	  legal	  IT	  and	  promptly	  demands	  that	  its	  contract	  manufacturers	  legalize	  if	  they	  are	  in	  violation	   of	   the	   Washington	   statute	   or	   (2)	   the	   hiring	   firm	   employs	  responsible	  supply-­‐chain	  practices	  related	  to	  the	  use	  of	  IT.107	  
D.	  	  	   In	  Rem	  Proceedings	  When	   those	  who	  have	   stolen	   IT	  or	  other	  non-­‐tangible	   assets	   are	   in-­‐state	   and	   before	   a	   court,	   there	   are,	   as	   discussed	   above,	   a	   number	   of	  options	   for	   sanctions.	   	   Enforcement	  with	   out-­‐of-­‐state	   or	   foreign	   parties	  presents	   more	   challenges,	   particularly	   in	   light	   of	   the	   Court’s	   refusal	   to	  resolve	  in	  Nicastro108	  and	  Goodyear109	  the	  in	  personam	  jurisdiction	  issues	  raised	   in	  Asahi.110	   	   This	   problem	   set	   arises	   anytime	   a	   U.S.	   consumer	   or	  business	   is	   affected	   adversely	   by	   the	   sale	   or	   distribution	   of	   unsafe,	  defective,	  or	  otherwise	  flawed	  (e.g.,	  made	  with,	  or	  benefitting	  from,	  stolen	  IT	  or	  IP)	  foreign-­‐made	  goods.	   	  Even	  when	  sales	  are	  part	  of	  a	  multi-­‐state	  distribution	   program—if	   the	   conventional	   minimum	   contact	  requirements	   of	  Asahi	   are	   not	  met,	   jurisdiction	   over	   a	   foreign	   company	  can	   be	   extraordinarily	   difficult,	   if	   not	   impossible.111	   	   Asahi	   did	   invite	  Congress	  to	  address	  the	  jurisdictional	  void	  for	  federal	  court	  jurisdiction,	  but	  thus	  far	  Congress	  has	  failed	  to	  do	  so.112	  	  Accordingly,	  jurisdiction	  over	  the	  person	  (for	  foreign	  producers)	  cannot	  be	  the	  sole	  means	  of	  achieving	  the	   objectives	   of	   a	   level	   playing	   field,	   merit-­‐based	   competition,	   and	  appropriate	   protection	   for	   those	  who	   create	   the	   technology	   that	   drives	  
 104. 	  Id.	  §§	  19.330.060(2)–(3).	  105. 	  Id.	  §	  19.330.060(2)(d).	  106. 	  Id.	  §§	  19.330.060(1)(a),	  19.330.060(2).	  107. 	  Id.	  §	  19.330.080(1)(c)–(d).	  	  	  108. 	  J.	  McIntyre	  Mach.,	  Ltd.	  v.	  Nicastro,	  131	  S.	  Ct.	  2780,	  2791	  (2011).	  109. 	  Goodyear	  Dunlop	  Tires	  Operations,	  S.A.	  v.	  Brown,	  131	  S.	  Ct.	  2846,	  2851	  (2011).	  110. 	  Asahi	  Metal	  Indus.	  Co.	  v.	  Superior	  Court,	  480	  U.S.	  102	  (1987).	  111. 	  Id.	  112. 	  Id.	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the	  American	  economy.	  In	   Washington	   State,	   if	   a	   manufacturer	   is	   beyond	   the	   court’s	   in	  
personam	   jurisdiction,	   a	   complainant	   may	   proceed	   in	   court	   directly	  against	   products	   for	   which	   the	  manufacturer	   holds	   title	   and	  which	   are	  offered	  for	  sale	  in	  Washington	  State	  in	  violation	  of	  section	  20.113	  	  As	  with	  injunctions	  against	  sales,	  in	  rem	  actions	  are	  limited	  to	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  manufacturer’s	  violation	  resulted	  in	  at	  least	  a	  three	  percent	  difference	  in	  the	  product’s	  retail	  price	  over	  a	  four-­‐month	  period.114	  Section	  60	  of	  the	  Washington	  statute	  authorizes	  the	  court,	   in	  certain	  situations,	  to	  enjoin	  in-­‐state	  sales	  of	  products	  made	  with	  stolen	  IT	  in	  the	  state,	   while	   section	   	  70	   authorizes	   the	   court	   to	   proceed	   in	   rem	   against	  products	   made	   with	   stolen	   IT,	   when	   the	   court	   is	   unable	   to	   obtain	  personal	  jurisdiction	  over	  the	  manufacturer.115	  	  Remedies	  of	  this	  type	  are	  not	  unprecedented.	  	  Seizing	  property	  to	  avoid	  harms	  that	  flow	  inevitably	  from	  the	  entry	  of	  these	  goods	  into	  the	  stream	  of	  commerce	  is	  very	  much	  part	  of	  U.S.	  legal	  history.	  In	   her	   article,	   International	   Courts	   and	   the	   U.S.	   Constitution:	  
Reexamining	   the	   History,	   Professor	   Jenny	  Martinez	   discusses,	   inter	   alia,	  the	   early	   piracy	   and	   slave-­‐ship	   seizure	   cases	   decided	   before	   the	   Civil	  War116	   (and,	   of	   course,	   prior	   to	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   Thirteenth	  Amendment).	   	   These	   decisions,	   beginning	   in	   1796,	   predate	   the	   formal	  national	   legal	  condemnation	  of	  slavery—and	  yet	  ships	  were	  seized	  even	  though	  slave	  traders	  were	  not	  prosecuted.117	  
United	  States	  v.	  La	  Vengeance	   involved	  the	  seizure	  of	  a	  ship	  allegedly	  designed	   and	   outfitted	   for	   piracy.118	   	   The	   Court	   considered	   whether	  denial	   of	   a	   jury	   trial,	   as	   required	  under	   the	  newly	  minted	   Judiciary	  Act,	  violated	   the	   rights	   of	   the	   parties	   and	   found	   that	   the	   seizure	   was	   not	   a	  criminal	  act,	  but	  rather	  an	  action	  in	  admirality.119	   	  “It	   is	  a	  process	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  a	  libel	  in	  rem;	  and	  does	  not,	  in	  any	  degree,	  touch	  the	  person	  of	  the	   offender.”120	   	   A	   decade	   later,	   The	   Schooner	   Sally	   upheld	   property	  
 113. 	  WASH.	  REV.	  CODE	  ANN.	  §	  19.330.070(1)	  (2012).	  114. 	  Id.	  §§	  19.330.020,	  19.330.010(5).	  115. 	  Id.	  §§	  19.330.060(1)(a),	  19.330.070.	  116. 	   Jenny	  S.	  Martinez,	   International	  Courts	  and	   the	  U.S.	  Constitution:	  Reexamining	   the	  
History,	  159	  U.	  PA.	  L.	  REV.	  1069,	  1101	  (2011).	  117. 	   The	   Slavers	   (Reindeer),	   69	  U.S.	   (2	  Wall.)	   383,	   393,	   403	   (1864)	   (“[L]ibels	   in	   rem	  may	  be	  prosecuted	  in	  any	  district	  where	  the	  property	  is	  found.”);	  The	  Slavers	  (Kate),	  69	  U.S.	  (2	  Wall.)	  350,	  366	  (1864)	  (involving	  an	  in	  rem	  proceeding	  to	  seize	  a	  vessel	  designed	  to	  transport	  and	  sell	  slaves);	  The	  Josefa	  Segunda,	  18	  U.S.	  (5	  Wheat.)	  338,	  343	  (1820)	  (involving	  seizure	  and	  condemnation	  of	  property	  used	  in	  slave	  trade).	  118. 	  3	  U.S.	  (3	  Dall.)	  297,	  301	  (1796).	  119. 	  Id.	  at	  299.	  120. 	  Id.	  at	  301.	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forfeiture	  without	  a	  personal	  prosecution.121	  
The	  Palmyra	  is	  another	  case	  in	  which	  an	  in	  rem	  seizure	  of	  a	  vessel	  was	  upheld,	   notwithstanding	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   charge	   (in	   that	   instance,	   for	  piracy)	  against	  any	  person.122	  	  Unlike	  a	  case	  directed	  against	  a	  person,123	  an	   in	   rem	   action	   is	   focused	   on	   a	   “thing	  .	  .	  .	   here	   primarily	   considered	   as	  the	   offender.	   	   Many	   cases	   exist[]	   where	   the	   forfeiture	   for	   acts	   done	  attaches	  solely	  in	  rem,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  accompanying	  penalty	  in	  personam.	  [Such]	  prosecutions	  [are	  not]	  dependent	  upon	  each	  other.	   	   [P]roceeding	  
in	   rem	   stands	   independent	   of,	   and	   wholly	   unaffected	   by	   any	   criminal	  proceeding	  in	  personam.”124	  More	   recent	   cases	  have	   relied	  on	  The	  Palmyra.	   	   In	  Ursery,	   the	  Court	  continued	   to	   distinguish	   between	   personal	   cases	   and	   in	   rem	   actions.125	  	  The	  Court,	  however,	  labeled	  this	  distinction	  a	  fiction	  when	  the	  forfeiture	  is	   a	   sanction	   against	   an	   individual	   who	   has	   committed	   an	   offense,	   as	  opposed	  to	  a	  forfeiture	  designed	  to	  achieve	  general	  compliance	  with	  a	  set	  of	  clearly	  articulated	  legislative	  goals.126	  	  An	  in	  rem	  forfeiture	  of	  property	  that	   is	   exclusively	   an	   “instrumentality”	   of	   an	   offense	   is	   arguably	  permissible	   and	   is	   not	   a	   punishment	   of	   the	   owner.127	   	   Civil	   forfeitures	  designed	   to	   limit	   or	   prevent	   unlawful	   actions	   are,	   however,	   fairly	  common.128	   	   An	   object	   can	   “evidence”	   a	   violation	   even	   if	   the	   current	  
 121. 	  United	  States	  v.	  Schooner	  Sally,	  6	  U.S.	  (2	  Cranch)	  406	  (1805).	  122. 	  The	  Palmyra,	  25	  U.S.	  (12	  Wheat.)	  1,	  12–13	  (1827).	  123. 	  See	  Harmoney	  v.	  United	  States	  (The	  Brig	  Malek	  Adhel),	  43	  U.S.	  (2	  How.)	  210,	  233	  (1844)	   (“The	   vessel	   which	   commits	   the	   aggression	   is	   treated	   as	   the	   offender,	   as	   the	   guilty	  instrument	  or	  thing	  to	  which	  the	  forfeiture	  attaches,	  without	  any	  reference	  whatsoever	  to	  the	  character	  or	  conduct	  of	  the	  owner.”).	  124. 	  The	   Palmyra,	   12	  Wheat.	   at	   14–15.	   	   In	  Bajakajian,	   the	   Court	   discussed	   explained	  that	   the	   “‘guilty	   property’	   theory	   behind	   in	   rem	   forfeiture	   can	   be	   traced	   to	   the	   Bible,	   which	  describes	  property	  being	  sacrificed	  to	  God	  as	  a	  means	  of	  atoning	  for	  an	  offense.”	  524	  U.S	  321,	  330	  n.5	  (1998).	  	  See,	  e.g.,	  Exodus	  21:28.	  	  In	  medieval	  Europe	  and	  at	  common	  law,	  this	  concept	  evolved	  into	  the	  law	  of	  deodand,	  in	  which	  offending	  property	  was	  condemned	  and	  confiscated	  by	  the	  church	  or	  the	  Crown	  in	  remediation	  for	  the	  harm	  it	  had	  caused.	   	  See	  1	  MATTHEW	  HALE,	  PLEAS	  OF	  THE	  CROWN	  420–24	  (1st	  Am.	  ed.	  1847);	  1	  WILLIAM	  BLACKSTONE,	  COMMENTARIES	  ON	  THE	  LAW	  OF	  ENGLAND	  *290–92;	  OLIVER	  WENDELL	  HOLMES,	  THE	  COMMON	  LAW	  10–13,	  23–27	  (M.	  Howe	  ed.	  1963).	  125. 	  United	  States	  v.	  Ursery,	  518	  U.S.	  267,	  274–75	  (1996)	  (distinguishing	  a	  civil	  in	  rem	  forfeiture	  action	  from	  a	  “personal	  penalty”)	  (citing	  The	  Palmyra,	  12	  Wheat.	  at	  14–15).	  126. 	   Bajakajian,	   524	   U.S	   at	   326;	   Ursery,	   518	   U.S.	   at	   293	   (Kennedy,	   J.,	   concurring)	  (“[C]ivil	  in	  rem	  forfeiture	  is	  not	  punishment	  of	  the	  wrongdoer	  for	  his	  criminal	  offense.”).	  127. 	  See	  Austin	  v.	  United	  States,	  509	  U.S.	  602,	  627–28	  (Scalia,	  J.,	  concurring	  in	  part	  and	  concurring	   in	   the	   judgment)	   (distinguishing	   property	   as	   the	   vehicle	   used	   to	   commit	   an	  offense);	  Goldsmith-­‐Grant	  Co.	  v.	  United	  States,	  254	  U.S.	  505,	  508–10	  (1921).	  128. 	  United	  States	  v.	  Nichols,	  841	  F.2d	  1485,	  1486–87	  (10th	  Cir.	  1988)	  (“Civil	  forfeiture	  has	  been	  widely	  used	   in	   the	  United	   States.	   	   Typically	   the	   government	  has	  been	  permitted	   to	  seek	  the	  forfeiture	  of	  contraband	  or	  harmful	  instrumentalities	  employed	  in	  an	  illegal	  activity	  .	  .	  .	  to	   obtain	   ‘virtually	   any	   type	   of	   property	   that	   might	   be	   used	   in	   the	   conduct	   of	   a	   criminal	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owner	  was	  not	  actively	  involved	  in	  the	  misconduct.	  	  When	  that	  happens,	  the	   “guilty	   object”	   can	   be	   seized	   and	   forfeited—and	   the	   forfeiture	  furthers	  enforcement	  of	  the	  underlying	  statute	  or	  regulation.129	  IV.	  	  	  PRECEDENT	  FOR	  THE	  WASHINGTON	  STATUTE	  Although	   the	   Washington	   statute	   embodies	   a	   novel	   approach	   to	  problems	  arising	  from	  IT	  theft,	  precedent	  for	  some	  aspects	  of	  the	  statute	  can	  be	  found	  in	  other	  areas	  of	  law.	  
A.	  	  	   Enacting	  a	  State	  Statute	  to	  Address	  a	  Specific	  Method	  of	  Unfair	  
Competition:	  Trade	  Secrets	  State	   law	   on	   the	   misappropriation	   of	   trade	   secrets	   provides	   an	  interesting	  analogy	  to	  the	  type	  of	  conduct	  prohibited	  by	  the	  Washington	  statute.	   	   As	   courts	   have	   recognized,	   “[t]he	   law	   governing	   protection	   of	  trade	   secrets	   essentially	   is	   designed	   to	   regulate	   unfair	   business	  competition.”130	   	   Both	   the	   tort	   of	  misappropriation	   of	   trade	   secrets	   and	  the	   Washington	   statute	   seek	   to	   provide	   a	   remedy	   for	   the	   unfair	  competition	   and	  market	   distortions	   that	   occur	  when	   companies	   seek	   a	  market	   advantage	   by	   stealing	   the	   inventions,	   property,	   or	   other	  intangible	  assets	  of	  another.	  Trade	  secret	  law	  is	  ancient,	  arcane,	  and	  comprised	  of	  a	  patchwork	  of	  state	   trade	   secret	   protections,	   some	   statutory	   and	   some	   derived	   from	  common	  law	  claims.131	   	  “Trade	  secret	   litigation	  is	  particularly	  important	  to	  small	  companies.”132	  Although	   trade	   secrets	  were	   once	   a	   purely	   state	  matter,	   the	   United	  States,	  as	  a	  party	  to	  the	  World	  Trade	  Organization’s	  Agreement	  on	  Trade-­‐Related	  Aspects	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  (TRIPS),133	  now	  provides	  
 enterprise.’”	  (citing	  Calero-­‐Toledo	  v.	  Pearson	  Yacht	  Leasing	  Co.,	  416	  U.S.	  663,	  683)));	  See,	  e.g.,	  United	   States	   v.	   Mandel,	   408	   F.	   Supp.	   679,	   682	   (D.	   Md.	   1976)	   (on	   the	   frequency	   of	   seizing	  automobiles	  or	  firearms).	  129. 	   “Traditionally,	   forfeiture	   actions	  have	  proceeded	  upon	   the	   fiction	   that	   inanimate	  objects	   themselves	   can	  be	   guilty	   of	  wrongdoing.	   	   Simply	  put,	   the	   theory	  has	   been	   that	   if	   the	  object	  is	  ‘guilty,’	  it	  should	  be	  held	  forfeit.”	  	  United	  States	  v.	  U.S.	  Coin	  &	  Currency,	  401	  U.S.	  715,	  719	  (1971)	  (citations	  omitted).	  130. 	  Univ.	  Computing	  Co.	  v.	  Lykes-­‐Youngstown	  Corp.,	  504	  F.2d	  518,	  539	  (5th	  Cir.	  1974).	  131. 	  ROBERT	  P.	  MERGES,	   PETER	   S.	  MENELL,	  &	  MARK	  A.	   LEMLEY,	   INTELLECTUAL	  PROPERTY	   IN	  THE	  NEW	  TECHNOLOGICAL	   AGE	   33–35	   (5th	   ed.	   2010)	   (discussing	   the	   Roman	   cause	   of	   action	   in	  
actio	  servi	  corrupti,	  or	  “literally,	  an	  action	  for	  corrupting	  a	  slave”).	  132. 	  Id.	  at	  35.	   	  See	  generally	  J.	  Jonas	  Anderson,	  Secret	  Inventions,	  26	  BERKELEY	  TECH	  L.J.	  917,	   920	   (2011)	   (discussing	   the	   historical	   interplay	   between	   patent	   and	   trade	   secret	   rights,	  and	  advocating	  for	  an	  increased	  use	  of	  trade	  secrets	  to	  protect	  inventive	  concepts).	  133. 	  Agreement	  on	  Trade-­‐Related	  Aspects	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights,	  Apr.	  15,	  1994,	  1869	   U.N.T.S.	   299,	   33	   I.L.M.	   1197	   (1994)	   [hereinafter	   TRIPS	   Agreement],	   available	   at	  http://www.worldtradelaw.net/uragreements/tripsagreement.pdf.	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national	  protection	  to	  trade	  secrets.134	  	  The	  U.S.	  has	  complied	  through	  the	  Economic	   Espionage	   Act	   of	   1996	   (EEA)	   as	   well	   as	   through	   state	   law	  protection	  of	  trade	  secrets.135	  1.	  	  	   Restatement	  of	  Torts,	  §	  39	  and	  the	  Uniform	  Trade	  Secret	  Act	  Until	  recently,	  the	  common	  law	  of	  the	  states	  was	  the	  primary	  source	  of	   trade	   secret	   protection.	   	   Today,	   it	   is	   embodied	   in	   the	  Uniform	  Trade	  Secrets	   Act	   (UTSA):	   “State	   laws	   generally	   define	   a	   trade	   secret	   as	  consisting	   of	   three	   elements:	   (1)	   information	   (2)	   that	   has	   actual	   or	  potential	  economic	  value	  because	   it	   is	   secret	  and	  (3)	   is,	   in	   fact,	  a	   secret.	  	  The	   UTSA	   additionally	   requires	   that	   a	   potential	   rights	   holder	   make	   a	  reasonable	  effort	  to	  maintain	  the	  secrecy	  of	  the	  information.”136	  Currently,	   forty-­‐six	  states	  have	  adopted	  the	  UTSA	   in	  some	  form,	  and	  two	  are	   currently	   considering	   it.137	   	  However,	   the	   laws	  adopted	  are	  not	  uniform	  and	  have	  variations	   in	  statutes	  of	   limitations,	  criminal	  and	  civil	  penalties,	   and	   the	  causes	  of	  action	  one	  can	  bring.	   	  The	  goals	  underlying	  these	   laws,	   like	   the	   goals	   underlying	   the	   Washington	   statute,	   are	  protection	   and	   encouragement	   of	   creativity,	   invention,	   and	   innovation	  without	  hampering	  unduly	  the	  public	  access	  to	  information.	  2.	  	  	   Federalizing	  Trade	  Secret	  Law	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  both	  comply	  with	  TRIPS	  and	  strengthen	  trade	  secret	  
 134. 	  TRIPS	  Agreement	  art.	  39.	  	  Article	  39	  reads	  in	  relevant	  part:	  	  1.	  In	  the	  course	  of	  ensuring	  effective	  protection	  against	  unfair	  competition	  as	  provided	  in	   Article	   10bis	  of	   the	   Paris	   Convention	   (1967),	  Members	   shall	   protect	   undisclosed	  information	   in	  accordance	  with	  paragraph	  2	  and	  data	   submitted	   to	  governments	  or	  governmental	  agencies	  in	  accordance	  with	  paragraph	  3.	  2.	   Natural	   and	   legal	   persons	   shall	   have	   the	   possibility	   of	   preventing	   information	  lawfully	  within	  their	  control	   from	  being	  disclosed	  to,	  acquired	  by,	  or	  used	  by	  others	  without	  their	  consent	  in	  a	  manner	  contrary	  to	  honest	  commercial	  practices	  so	  long	  as	  such	  information:	  (a)	   is	  secret	   in	  the	  sense	  that	   it	   is	  not,	  as	  a	  body	  or	   in	  the	  precise	  configuration	  and	  assembly	  of	  its	  components,	  generally	  known	  among	  or	  readily	  accessible	  to	  persons	  within	  the	  circles	  that	  normally	  deal	  with	  the	  kind	  of	  information	  in	  question;	  (b)	  has	  commercial	  value	  because	  it	  is	  secret;	  and	  (c)	   has	   been	   subject	   to	   reasonable	   steps	   under	   the	   circumstances,	   by	   the	   person	  lawfully	  in	  control	  of	  the	  information,	  to	  keep	  it	  secret.	  
Id.	  (emphasis	  added).	  135. 	   See	   Robin	   J.	   Effron,	   Note,	   Secrets	   and	   Spies:	   Extraterritorial	   Application	   of	   the	  
Economic	  Espionage	  Act	  and	  the	  TRIPS	  Agreement,	  78	  N.Y.U.	  L.	  REV.	  1475,	  1477	  (2003).	  136. 	  Id.	  at	  1484	  (footnote	  omitted).	  137. 	  See	  State	  Should	  Adopt	  Protections	  for	  Trade	  Secrets,	  NEWBURY	  PORT	  NEWS	  (Oct.	  19,	  2011),	   http://www.newburyportnews.com/opinion/x744038983/State-­‐should-­‐adopt-­‐protections-­‐for-­‐trade-­‐secrets.	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protection,	  in	  1996,	  Congress	  passed	  the	  EEA,138	  which	  provides	  criminal	  and	   civil	   penalties	   for	   economic	   and	   industrial	   espionage.139	   	   In	   the	  legislative	  history	   leading	   to	   the	  passage	  of	   the	  EEA,	  one	  senator	   stated	  that	  there	  were	  “glaring	  gaps”	  in	  state	  trade	  secret	   law	  that	  only	  federal	  legislation	  could	  rectify.140	  	  Recently,	  some	  have	  argued	  that	  trade	  secret	  law	   should	   be	   further	   federalized,	   particularly	   in	   light	   of	   the	   EEA	   and	  TRIPS.141	  Senators	  Herb	  Kohl	  and	  Christopher	  Coons	  introduced	  an	  amendment	  to	   the	  Currency	  Exchange	  Rate	  Oversight	  Reform	  Act	   that	  would	   give	   a	  private	   federal	   right	   of	   action	   to	   trade	   secret	   owners	   for	   violations	   of	  §	  1832(a)	  or	  trade	  secret	  theft.142	  	  This	  amendment	  would	  provide	  a	  right	  of	   civil	   action	   under	   the	   EEA	   for	   one	   “aggrieved	   by	   a	   violation	   of	  §	  1832(a).”143	  	  Section	  1832(a)	  describes	  one	  of	  the	  two	  types	  of	  conduct	  prohibited	   under	   the	   EEA.	   	   It	   applies	   to	  misappropriating	   trade	   secrets	  related	   to	  or	   included	   in	   a	  product	  placed	   in	   interstate	   commerce,	  with	  the	   knowledge	   that	   the	   misappropriation	   will	   injure	   the	   trade	   secret	  owner.	  144	  Like	   the	   unfair	   competition	   theories	   and	   state	   statutes	   discussed	  above,	  state	  and	  federal	  trade	  secret	  laws	  seek	  to	  remedy	  the	  harms	  that	  businesses	   suffer	   when	   a	   competitor	   steals	   and	   benefits	   from	   a	  company’s	   trade	  secret.	   	  While	   the	   theft	   in	   the	   former	  case	   involves	   the	  
 138. 	  Economic	  Espionage	  Act	  of	  1996,	  Pub.	  L.	  No.	  104-­‐294,	  110	  Stat.	  3488	  (codified	  at	  18	  U.S.C.	  §§	  1831–1839	  (2006)),	  available	  at	  http://www.economicespionage.com/EEA.html.	  139. 	   Gerald	   O’Hara,	   Comment,	   Cyber-­‐Espionage:	   A	   Growing	   Threat	   to	   the	   American	  
Economy,	  19	  COMM.	  LAW	  CONSPECTUS	  241,	  241–42	  n.3	  (2010)	  (defining	  the	  difference	  between	  industrial	  and	  economic	  espionage	  as	  the	  difference	  between	  benefactors:	  industrial	  espionage	  benefits	   anyone	   other	   than	   the	   owner,	   while	   the	   narrower	   economic	   espionage	   benefits	   “a	  foreign	  government,	  foreign	  instrumentality,	  or	  foreign	  agent”).	  140. 	   142	   CONG.	   REC.	   S12,	   207–08	   (daily	   ed.	   Oct.	   2,	   1996)	   (statement	   of	   Sen.	   Specter)	  (explaining	  that	  the	  legislative	  history	  of	  the	  EEA	  includes	  many	  examples	  of	  trade	  secret	  theft	  and	  misappropriation	  that	  state	  law	  cannot	  address).	  141. 	   David	   Almeling,	   Guest	   Post:	   First	   Patent	   Reform,	   Now	   Trade	   Secret	   Reform?,	  PATENTLY-­‐O	   BLOG	   (Oct.	   12,	   2011,	   3:08	   PM),	  http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/10/almeling-­‐trade-­‐secret.html.	  142. 	   Id.;	   Press	   Release,	   Senator	   Kohl,	   Kohl	   Offers	   Amendment	   to	   Protect	   American	  Businesses	   (Oct.	   5,	   2011),	  http://www.kohl.senate.gov/newsroom/pressrelease.cfm?customel_dataPageID_1464=4775;	  Press	  Release,	  Senator	  Coons,	  Senator	  Coons	  Introduces	  Two	  Amendments	  to	  Currency	  Bill	  to	  Protect	   American	   Intellectual	   Property	   (Protecting	   American	   Innovation	   is	   Critical	   to	  Protecting	   American	   Jobs)	   (Oct.	   5,	   2011),	  http://coons.senate.gov/newsroom/releases/release/senator-­‐coons-­‐introduces-­‐two-­‐amendments-­‐to-­‐currency-­‐bill-­‐to-­‐protect-­‐american-­‐intellectual-­‐property.	  143. 	  Federal	  Jurisdiction	  for	  Theft	  of	  Trade	  Secrets,	  S.	  1619,	  112th	  Cong.	  (Oct.	  5,	  2011)	  (proposed	  by	  Sen.	  Coons	  and	  Sen.	  Kohls),	  available	  at	  http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-­‐2011-­‐10-­‐05/html/CREC-­‐2011-­‐10-­‐05-­‐pt1-­‐PgS6227.htm.	  144. 	  18	  U.S.C.	  §	  1832.	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property	   of	   a	   third	   party	   (in	   this	   case,	   the	   IT	   owner),	   the	   harm	   to	  competitors,	   and	   ultimately	   to	   consumers,	  will	   often	   be	   quite	   similar—law-­‐abiding	   firms	   will	   be	   placed	   at	   a	   competitive	   disadvantage	   in	   the	  marketplace	  due	  to	  their	  competitor’s	  theft	  of	  property.	  
B.	  	  	   Dual-­‐Track	  Enforcement	  by	  State	  Regulators	  and	  Private	  Attorneys	  
General	  As	  noted	  above,	  the	  Washington	  statute	  provides	  a	  cause	  of	  action	  not	  only	   for	   the	   state’s	   attorney	   general,	   but	   also	   for	   injured	   competitors.	  	  The	   notion	   of	   a	   combined	   effort	   that	   includes	   enforcement	   by	   state	  attorneys	   general	   and	   private	   parties	   (in	   this	   case,	   manufacturers	   that	  have	  been	  victims	  of	  unfair	  competition	  by	  competitors	  using	  stolen	  IT)	  is	  well-­‐suited	   to	  meet	   the	   challenge	   presented	   by	   stolen	   IT.	   	   In	   looking	   at	  problems	  with	  managed	  health	   care,	  Professor	  Marc	  Rodwin	  noted	   that	  when	  dealing	  with	  broadly	  defined	  “unfair	  or	  deceptive	  trade	  practices,”	  enforcement	   can	   be	   shared	   by	   state	   “regulatory	   agencies,	   such	   as	   the	  Attorney	  General’s	  Office	  of	  Consumer	  Protection,	  and	  private	  parties	  .	  .	  .	  [who	   can	   be	   awarded]	   treble	   damages	   and	  .	  .	  .	   plaintiffs’	   attorneys’	  fees.”145	  The	   Washington	   statute	   adopts	   just	   such	   a	   dual-­‐track	   enforcement	  regime,	   and	   in	   doing	   so,	   sends	   a	   powerful	  message.	   	   Professor	   Rodwin	  noted	   that	   fines	   or	   other	   sanctions	   “provide	   an	   incentive	   for	   sellers	   to	  resolve	  private	  disputes	  out	  of	  court.”146	  	  Statutes	  of	  this	  type	  also	  create	  the	  potential	  that	  fines	  or	  penalties	  will	  cover	  litigation	  costs,	  which	  helps	  consumers—or	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Washington	   statute,	   law-­‐abiding	  manufacturers—	   “without	   funds	   to	   bring	   suits.”147	   	   Protection	   of	   the	  interests	  of	  those	  victimized	  by	  the	  market	  distortions	  caused	  by	  theft	  of	  IT	   is	   consistent	   with	   current	   thinking	   on	   the	   role	   of	   private	   attorneys	  general.148	  	  This	  is	  particularly	  true	  where	  rights	  are	  violated	  and	  existing	  enforcement	   is	   insufficient	   due	   to	   a	   lack	   of	   information,	   incentives,	   or	  
 145. 	  Rodwin,	  supra	  note	  37,	  at	  1363–64.	  	  	  146. 	  Id.	  at	  1364.	  147. 	  Id.	  148. 	   Id.;	  William	  B.	  Rubenstein,	  On	  What	   a	   “Private	  Attorney	  General”	   Is—And	  Why	   It	  
Matters,	   57	  VAND.	   L.	   REV.	   2129,	   2131	   (2004)	   (defining	   broadly	   the	   role	   of	   	   private	   attorneys	  general	  who	  pursue	  public	  interests	  on	  behalf	  of	  private	  clients);	  see	  also	  Jeremy	  A.	  Rabkin,	  The	  
Secret	  Life	  of	  the	  Private	  Attorney	  General,	  61	  LAW	  &	  CONTEMP.	  PROBS.	  179	  (1998)	  (exploring	  the	  traditional	   role	   of	   the	   private	   attorney	   general	   model);	   see	   Abizer	   Zanzi,	   Note,	   The	  
Constitutional	   Battle	   Over	   the	   Public	   Interest	   Litigant	   Exception	   to	   Rule	   82,	   21	   ALASKA	   L.	   REV.	  329,	  334	  (2004)	  (describing	  a	  private	  attorney	  general	  as	  one	  who	  fights	  for	  a	  public	  interest	  on	   behalf	   of	   a	   non-­‐governmental	   client).	   The	   Washington	   statute	   does	   not	   authorize	   true	  private	  attorney	  general	  actions,	  as	  a	  private	  party	  must	  prove	  competitive	  injury	  in	  order	  to	  have	  standing	  and	  can	  seek	  a	  remedy	  only	  for	  its	  own	  injury.	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other	  factors.149	  
C.	  	  	   Gatekeeper	  Liability	  Another	   fundamental	   challenge	   to	   protecting	   IT	   and	   other	   non-­‐tangible	  assets	  involves	  the	  ease	  of	  copying	  and	  the	  difficulty	  of	  detecting	  theft.	   	   This	   type	   of	   property	   is	   at	   once	   valuable	   and	   vulnerable.	   	  Unlike	  conventional	  physical	  property,	  once	  it	  moves	  beyond	  the	  dominion	  and	  control	  of	  its	  inventors	  and	  creators,	  the	  enforcement	  landscape	  becomes	  complex.	  	  Protection	  against	  IT	  theft,	  or	  other	  forms	  of	  misappropriation	  of	   intangible	  assets,	  must	  rely	  on	  contracts,	   licensing	  agreements,	  public	  (domestic	   and	   international)	   and	   private	   enforcement	   of	   patent,	  copyright,	   and	   trademark	   statutes,	   regulations,	   treaties,	   and	   similar	  regimes.	  	  While	  that	  level	  of	  protection	  may	  seem	  substantial,	  150	  as	  noted	  at	   the	   outset	   of	   this	   paper,	   it	   has	   been	   insufficient	   to	   prevent	   theft	   of	  billions	   of	   dollars	   of	   this	   property.	   	   Moreover,	  modest	   state	   legislation,	  designed	  to	  discourage	  theft	  and	  piracy,	  with	  generous	  notice	  provisions,	  limited	  sanction	  potential,	  and	  limited	  scope	  (excluding	  from	  its	  coverage	  copyright	  and	  other	  conventional	  intellectual	  property)	  is	  hardly	  the	  stuff	  of	  suppression.	  A	  culture	  of	  misappropriation	  has	  evolved	  around	  these	  assets,	  both	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  abroad.151	  	  In	  many	  jurisdictions,	  including	  those	  that	  account	  for	  a	  significant	  share	  of	  global	  manufacturing,	  software	  and	  related	  products	  are	  copied	  without	  authorization	  and	  used	  at	  staggering	  levels.152	  	  Nonetheless,	  there	  are	  those	  who	  take	  the	  position	  that	  as	  long	  as	  a	  lower	  consumer	  price	  is	  the	  final	  goal,	  the	  market	  has	  succeeded	  and	  legal	  interference	  is	  unwarranted.	   	  Similar	  arguments	  have	  been	  used	  in	  the	   past	   to	   rationalize	   inhumane	   work	   conditions,	   child	   labor,	   and	  manufacturers’	   environmentally	   hazardous	   practices.	   	   Acceptance	   of	  immoral	  or	  illegal	  conduct	  for	  short-­‐term	  commercial	  gain,	  if	  unchecked,	  becomes	  a	  “race	  to	  the	  bottom.”	  As	   noted	   earlier,	   companies	   that	   hire	   manufacturers	   to	   produce	  
 149. 	  Michael	   L.	  Rustad,	   Commentary,	  Smoke	   Signals	   from	  Private	  Attorneys	  General	   in	  
Mega	  Social	  Policy	  Cases,	  51	  DEPAUL	  L.	  REV.	  511,	  517	  (2001)	  (describing	  those	  acting	  as	  private	  attorneys	  general	  as	  advancing	  the	  public	  interest).	  150. 	   Gideon	   Parchomovsky	   &	   Alex	   Stein,	   Originality,	   95	   VA.	   L.	   REV.	   1505,	   1509–15	  (2009)	  (noting	  the	  perils	  of	  excessive	  copyright	  protection);	  Dorean	  M.	  Koenig,	  Joe	  Camel	  and	  
the	   First	   Amendment:	   The	   Dark	   Side	   of	   Copyright	   and	   Trademark-­‐Protected	   Icons,	   11	   T.M.	  COOLEY	   L.	   REV.	   803	   (1994)	   (arguing	   that	   intellectual	   property	   doctrines	   chill	   freedom	   of	  speech);	  Rosemary	  J.	  Coombe,	  Objects	  of	  Property	  and	  Subjects	  of	  Politics:	  Intellectual	  Property	  
Laws	  and	  Democratic	  Dialogue,	  69	  TEX.	  L.	  REV.	  1853,	  1866	  (1991)	  (suggesting	  that	  intellectual	  property	  doctrines	  may	  limit	  political	  speech).	  151. 	  Chen,	  supra	  note	  18.	  152. 	  Chow,	  supra	  note	  18.	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products	  on	  their	  behalf	  (and	  under	  their	  label),	  who	  turn	  a	  blind	  eye	  to	  the	   manufacturer’s	   theft	   of	   IT,	   reap	   an	   unfair	   cost	   advantage.	   	   These	  hiring	   firms	   are	   third-­‐party	   beneficiaries	   of	   misconduct.	   	   While	   the	  imposition	   of	   criminal	   liability	   in	   this	   instance	   is	   complex,153	   civil	  enforcement	  against	  third-­‐party	  beneficiaries	  is	  less	  complicated.	  Professor	   Reiner	   Kraackman	   posed	   the	   question	   succinctly:	   “When	  should	   we	   impose	   liability	   on	   parties	   who,	   although	   not	   the	   primary	  authors	   or	   beneficiaries	   of	   misconduct,	   might	   nonetheless	   be	   able	   to	  prevent	   it?”154	   	   Professor	   Kraackman	   used	   the	   term	   “gatekeeper”	   to	  describe	   those	   who	   benefit	   from	   misconduct	   and	   have	   the	   power	   or	  potential	  to	  lessen	  the	  probability	  of	  misconduct.	  	  He	  asks	  if	  the	  following	  criteria	   are	   present	   to	   assess	   whether	   a	   third-­‐party	   beneficiary	   of	  misconduct	   should	   be	   the	   subject	   of	   some	   form	   of	   enforcement	   or	  sanction:	  (1)	  serious	  misconduct	  that	  practicable	  penalties	  cannot	  deter;	  (2)	  missing	  or	  inadequate	  private	  gatekeeping	  incentives;	  (3)	   gatekeepers	   who	   can	   and	   will	   prevent	   misconduct	   reliably	  .	  .	  .	   ;	  and	  (4)	  gatekeepers	  whom	  legal	  rules	  can	  induce	  to	  detect	  misconduct	  at	  reasonable	  cost.155	  In	  the	  case	  of	  stolen	  IT	  used	  by	  manufacturers	  while	  acting	  on	  behalf	  of	   hiring	   firms,	   Professor	   Kraackman’s	   criteria	   are	   met.	   	   Currently,	  penalties	   do	   not	   deter	   such	   firms,	   which	   have	   few	   incentives	   to	   look	  upstream	   to	   discover	   misconduct	   by	   their	   contract	   manufacturers	   (at	  least	  with	  regard	  to	  IT	  theft),	  which	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  limit	  or	  prevent	  misconduct,	   and	   can,	  with	   a	  minimum	   of	   effort,	   use	   reasonable	   care	   to	  detect	   misconduct	   at	   a	   reasonable	   cost.	   	   Empowered	   to	   take	   action	   or	  face	  consequences,	  such	  firms	  can	  play	  a	  central	  role	  in	  lessening	  theft	  of	  IT.	  	  “[W]here	  gatekeepers	  and	  enforcement	  targets	  transact,	  gatekeepers	  can	   disrupt	   misconduct	   either	   by	   refusing	   to	   transact	   with	   would-­‐be	  wrongdoers	  at	  all	  or	  by	  refusing	  requests	  made	  by	  wrongdoers	  for	  illicit	  or	   substandard	   performance	   during	   the	   course	   of	   a	   broader	  transaction.”156	  In	   a	  Harvard	   Law	   Review	   piece	   a	   few	   years	   ago,	   Professor	   Daryl	   J.	  
 153. 	   Ellen	   M.	   Bublick,	   Symposium,	   Upside	   Down?	   Terrorists,	   Proprietors,	   and	   Civil	  
Responsibility	  for	  Crime	  Prevention	  in	  the	  Post-­‐9/11	  Tort-­‐Reform	  World,	  41	  LOY.	  L.A.	  L.	  REV.	  1483,	  1521	  (2008)	  (“Whether	  third	  parties	  should	  be	  fully	  liable	  for	  failure	  to	  protect	  against	  crime	  is	  a	  complex	  question.”).	  154. 	   Reinier	   H.	   Kraakman,	   Gatekeepers:	   The	   Anatomy	   of	   a	   Third-­‐Party	   Enforcement	  
Strategy,	  2	  J.L.	  ECON.	  &	  ORG.	  53,	  53	  (1986).	  155. 	  Id.	  at	  61.	  156. 	  Id.	  at	  62–63.	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Levinson	   explained	   that	   the	   means	   to	   efficient	   enforcement	   are	   not	  limited	  to	  direct	  prosecution.157	  	  He	  observed	  that	  proceeding	  against	  the	  “primary	   or	   proximate	   causer	   of	   harm”	   may	   be	   less	   effective	   than	  directing	  enforcement	  efforts	  at	  those	  who	  have	  the	  most	  influence	  over	  the	   wrongdoer.158	   	   “Courts	   (and	   even	   economic	   theorists)	   often	   fail	   to	  recognize	   that	   the	   optimal	   target	   of	   liability	   is	   not	   the	   wrongdoing	  injurer,	  but	  rather	  some	  other	  individual,	  institution,	  or	  group	  that	  is	  well	  situated	   to	   monitor	   and	   control	   the	   wrongdoer’s	   behavior	  .	  .	  .	  .”159	  	  Compliance	  motivation160—in	  this	  case,	  creating	   incentives	  against	   theft	  and	   unauthorized	   copying—might	   best	   be	   achieved	   by	   the	   “threat	   of	  ‘indirect’	  liability.”161	  Professor	  Levinson	  also	  recognizes	  that	  indirect	  liability	  is	  not	  always	  workable.	   “[I]ndirect	   liability	   is	   appropriate	   only	   in	   the	   limited	   set	   of	  cases	   in	   which	   direct	   liability	   is	   clearly	   impractical	   and	   an	   alternative	  target	  capable	  of	  exercising	  formal	  control	  over	  the	  primary	  wrongdoer,	  through	   a	   contractual	   or	   otherwise	   profitable	   relationship,	   is	   readily	  available.”162	   	   Those	   conditions	   (contract,	   profit,	   and	   capacity	   to	   apply	  compliance	   pressure)	   are	   evident	   in	   many	   settings	   where	   hiring	   firms	  indirectly	   “benefit”	   from	   theft	   of	   IT	   by	   their	   contract	  manufacturers	   (in	  the	   form	   of	   lower	   prices	   for	   manufactured	   goods).	   	   Moreover,	   there	   is	  good	   reason	   to	   think	   that	   hiring	   firms	   might	   be	   unusually	   effective	   in	  enforcing	  compliance	  by	  contract	  manufacturers.	   	  A	  well-­‐written	  statute	  “taps	  the	  best	  focusing	  device	  of	  all:	  a	  community	  of	  legally	  sophisticated	  gatekeepers.”163	  Professor	   Levinson	   focuses	   on	   the	  Aimster	   litigation,	   in	  which	   Judge	  Posner	  approved	  the	  imposition	  of	  liability	  against	  the	  intermediaries	  of	  wrongful	   conduct.164	   	   Though	  Aimster	   focused	   on	   an	   intermediary	  who	  
 157. 	   Daryl	   J.	   Levinson,	  Aimster	   and	   Optimal	   Targeting,	   120	   HARV.	   L.	   REV.	   1148,	   1148	  (2007).	  158. 	  Id.	  159. 	  Id.	  160. 	  Systems	  where	  a	   third	  party	   faces	  clear	  consequences	   for	   failing	   to	  act	  or	  report	  are	  not	  unusual.	  	  See	  Kraackman,	  supra	  note	  154,	  at	  65	  n.40	  (“Tax	  preparers	  are	  subject	  to	  $100	  and	   $500	   fines	   for	   negligent	   disregard	   of	   the	   law	   and	  willful	   understatement	   of	   tax	   liability	  respectively	   (IRC	   §	  6694,	   1985).”);	   see	   also	   Herman	  &	  MacLean	   v.	   Huddleston,	   459	  U.S.	   375,	  386	   n.22	   (1983)	   (finding	   no	   liability	   by	   implication	   for	   third	   parties	  who	   prepare	   securities	  registration	   statements;	   the	   duty	   must	   be	   express);	   Escott	   v.	   BarChris	   Constr.	   Corp.,	   283	   F.	  Supp.	  643,	  703	  (S.D.N.Y.	  1968)	  (stating	  that	  third	  party	  liability	  must	  be	  express).	  161. 	  Levinson,	  supra	  note	  157,	  at	  1148.	  162. 	  Id.	  at	  1154.	  163. 	   Kraackman,	   supra	   note	   154,	   at	   83	   (footnote	   omitted)	   (on	   the	   general	   effect	   of	   a	  third-­‐party	  regime	  and	  moral	  and	  legal	  suasion).	  164. 	  See	  Levinson,	  supra	  note	  157;	  In	  re	  Aimster	  Copyright	  Litig.,	  334	  F.3d	  643	  (7th	  Cir.	  2003).	  	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  followed,	  saying:	  “[O]ne	  who	  distributes	  a	  device	  with	  the	  object	  of	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facilitated	   illegal	   copyright	   infringement,	   the	   theory	   of	   indirect	   liability	  and	  Judge	  Posner’s	  embrace	  of	  it,	  can	  provide	  theoretical	  support	  for	  the	  ultimate	  practical	  effect	  of	   the	  Washington	  statute:	  holding	  third	  parties	  indirectly	  accountable	  for	  wrongful	  conduct	  committed	  by	  manufacturers	  of	   goods	   on	   their	   behalf.	   	   As	   Levinson	   explains,	   regardless	   of	   whether	  indirect	   liability	   is	  premised	  on	   the	   third	  party’s	  wrongdoing—as	   in	   the	  case	   of	   knowingly	   assisting	  wrongdoers—or	  purely	   vicarious	   liability—as	  with	   respondeat	   superior—indirect	   liability	   poses	   an	   opportunity	   for	  “motivating	   a	   well-­‐situated	   third	   party	   to	   police	   and	   prevent	  wrongdoing.”165	  The	  Washington	  statute	  imposes	  limited	  secondary	  responsibility	  on	  hiring	   firms	  on	   the	   theory	   that	  such	   firms	  are	  causally	   “responsible”	   for	  the	  harms	  targeted	  by	  the	  statute	  insofar	  as	  they	  have	  ultimate	  decision-­‐making	  authority	  regarding	  the	  sale	  of	  the	  goods	  in	  the	  State,	  and	  because	  they	   have	   a	   unique	   ability,	   given	   their	   commercial	   relationships,	   to	  discourage	  stolen	  IT	  use	  by	  their	  contract	  manufacturers.	  V.	  	  	   LEGAL	  AND	  ECONOMIC	  OBJECTIONS	  TO	  THE	  WASHINGTON	  STATUTE	  Some	   commentators	   assert	   that	   the	   Washington	   and	   Louisiana	  statutes	   are	   unconstitutional	   because	   they	   interfere	   with	   the	   power	   to	  regulate	  copyright	  or	  international	  commerce—powers	  that	  are	  reserved	  to	   Congress.166	   	   Other	   objectors	   might	   assert	   a	   more	   economics-­‐based	  argument:	   ethical	   competition	   and	   fairness	   should	   be	   subordinate	   to	  consumers’	   gain	   from	   lower	   prices.	   	   As	   discussed	   below,	   both	   of	   these	  contentions	  ring	  hollow.	  
A.	  	  	   Preemption	  The	   Supremacy	   Clause,167	   the	   constitutional	   base	   of	   preemption,	  
 promoting	  its	  use	  to	  infringe	  copyright,	  as	  shown	  by	  clear	  expression	  or	  other	  affirmative	  steps	  taken	   to	   foster	   infringement,	   is	   liable	   for	   the	   resulting	  acts	  of	   infringement	  by	   third	  parties.”	  	  Metro-­‐Goldwyn-­‐Mayer	   Studios	   Inc.	   v.	   Grokster,	   Ltd.,	   545	  U.S.	   913,	   919	   (2005).	   	   According	   to	  Levinson,	   however,	   Grokster	   “is	   a	   telling	   indication	   of	   the	   very	   limited	   distance	   from	   the	  traditional	  model	  that	  most	  courts	  will	  be	  willing	  to	  stray.”	  	  Levinson,	  supra	  note	  157,	  at	  1152.	  	  Nonetheless,	   neither	   Aimster	   nor	   Grokster	   involved	   an	   express	   statutory	   provision	   allowing	  indirect	  liability.	  Id.	  165. 	  Levinson,	  supra	  note	  157,	  at	  1150.	  	  Nevertheless,	  Levinson	  explains	  that	  there	  are	  two	   conditions	   for	   indirect	   liability	   to	   be	   efficient:	   1)	   the	   third	   party	   “must	   be	   capable	   of	  controlling	   wrongdoing	   in	   some	   cost-­‐effective	   way”	   and	   2)	   “the	   subsidiary	   costs	   of	   indirect	  liability	  must	  not	  be	  too	  high.”	  	  Id.	  at	  1150–51.	  166. 	  Why	   Is	   Microsoft	   Seeking	   New	   State	   Laws	   That	   Allow	   it	   to	   Sue	   Competitors	   For	  
Piracy	   by	   Overseas	   Suppliers?,	   GROKLAW	   (Mar.	   24,	   2011,	   9:46	   AM),	  http://www.groklaw.net/articlebasic.php?story=2011032316585825.	  167. 	  U.S.	  CONST.	  art.	  VI,	  cl.	  2	  (“This	  Constitution,	  and	  the	  Laws	  of	  the	  United	  States	  which	  shall	  be	  made	  in	  Pursuance	  thereof	  .	   .	   .	  shall	  be	  the	  supreme	  Law	  of	  the	  Land;	  .	  .	  .	  any	  Thing	  in	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ostensibly	   prohibits	   state	   laws	   that	   interfere	   or	   conflict	   with	   a	   federal	  law.168	  	  In	  recent	  years,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  has	  found	  that	  the	  Food,	  Drug,	  and	   Cosmetic	   Act	   (FDCA)169	   and	   the	   Hatch-­‐Waxman	   Act170	   preempted	  certain	   state	   tort	   claims.171	   	   “The	   purpose	   of	   Congress	   is	   the	   ultimate	  touchstone	   in	   every	   pre-­‐emption	   case.”172	   	   Thus,	   there	   must	   either	   be	  congressional	   intent	   to	  preempt	  or	  an	   inherent	   incompatibility	  between	  state	   and	   federal	   law.173	   	   If	   there	   is	   an	   explicit	   preemption	   clause,	   the	  Court	   must	   ascertain	   the	   scope	   of	   that	   which	   is	   preempted.174	   	   In	  
Goldstein	   v.	   California,175	   discussed	   effectively	   by	   Professor	   Viva	   R.	  Moffat,176	   the	  Court	   held	   that	   the	   enforcement	   of	   a	   state	   law	  would	  not	  stand	   as	   an	   obstacle	   to	   the	   achievement	   of	   a	   federal	   purpose	   where	  
Congress	  had	  not	  indicated	  it	  wished	  to	  regulate	  the	  act	  in	  question.177	  Some	   commentators	   have	   questioned	   whether	   the	   Washington	  statute	  might	  be	  preempted	  by	   federal	   copyright	   law.178	   	   Section	  301	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Copyright	  Act,	  which	  sets	  out	  the	  scope	  of	  preemption	  under	  the	  act,	  preempts	  state	   law	  only	   if	   that	   law	  (1)	  protects	   legal	  rights	  that	  are	  “equivalent	   to”	   rights	   protected	   by	   the	   Copyright	   Act	   and	   (2)	   regulates	  
 the	  Constitution	  or	  Laws	  of	  any	  State	  to	  the	  Contrary	  notwithstanding.”).	  168. 	  See	  Altria	  Grp.,	   Inc.	  v.	  Good,	  555	  U.S.	  70	  (2008);	  Maryland	  v.	  Louisiana,	  451	  U.	  S.	  725,	  746	  (1981);	  Gibbons	  v.	  Ogden,	  22	  U.S.	  1	  (1824).	  169. 	   Food,	   Drug,	   &	   Cosmetic	   Act,	   Pub.	   L.	   No.	   75-­‐717,	   ch.	   675,	   52	   Stat.	   1040	   (1938)	  (codified	  as	  amended	  in	  scattered	  sections	  of	  21	  U.S.C.).	  170. 	   Drug	   Price	   Competition	   and	   Patent	   Term	   Restoration	   (Hatch-­‐Waxman)	   Act	   of	  1984,	  Pub.	  L.	  No.	  98-­‐417,	  98	  Stat.	  1585	  (codified	  as	  amended	  at	  21	  U.S.C.	  §	  355(b),	  (j),	  (l);	  35	  U.S.C.	  §§	  156,	  271,	  282	  (2006)).	  171. 	  See	  Medtronic,	  Inc.	  v.	  Lohr,	  518	  U.S.	  470,	  485	  (1996).	   	  With	  the	  recent	  passage	  of	  the	  Biologics	  Price	  Competition	  and	   Innovation	  Act	  of	  2009,	   even	  more	   state	   law	   tort	   claims	  against	  biologics	  manufacturers	  may	  now	  be	  preempted.	  See	   Jonathan	  Stroud,	  Comment,	  The	  
Illusion	   of	   Interchangeability:	   The	   Benefits	   and	   Dangers	   of	   Guidance-­‐Plus	   Rulemaking	   in	   the	  
FDA’s	  Biosimilar	  Approval	  Process,	  63	  ADMIN.	  L.	  REV.	  599,	  600–02	  (2011)	  (discussing	  the	  scope	  of	   the	   new	   Act,	   which	   expands	   the	   FDA’s	   regulatory	   authority	   to	   cover	   generic	   biologics	   as	  well).	  172. 	  Medtronic,	  518	  U.S.	  at	  485	  (quoting	  Retail	  Clerks	  v.	  Schermerhorn,	  375	  U.S.	  96,	  103	  (1963))	  (internal	  quotation	  marks	  omitted).	  173. 	  Altria	  Grp.,	  555	  U.S.	  at	  76–77	  (citing	   Jones	  v.	  Rath	  Packing	  Co.,	  430	  U.S.	  519,	  525	  (1977).	  174. 	  Id.	  at	  77.	  175. 	  Goldstein	  v.	  California,	  412	  U.S.	  546	  ,	  561	  (1973).	  176. 	   Viva	   R.	   Moffat,	   Super-­‐Copyright:	   Contracts,	   Preemption,	   and	   the	   Structure	   of	  
Copyright	  Policymaking,	  41	  U.C.	  DAVIS	  L.	  REV.	  45,	  82–83	  (2007).	  177. 	   Goldstein,	   412	   U.S.	   at	   561,	   570	   (The	   Court	   concluded	   that	   “[i]n	   regard	   to	   this	  category	  of	   ‘Writings,’	  Congress	  has	  drawn	  no	  balance;	  rather,	   it	  has	  left	  the	  area	  unattended,	  and	  no	  reason	  exists	  why	  the	  State	  should	  not	  be	  free	  to	  act.”).	  	  	  178. 	   See	   Jan	   Teague,	   Guest	   Column:	   Microsoft	   Software-­‐Piracy	   Bills	   Would	   Harm	  
Businesses,	   SEATTLEPI.COM’S	   THE	   MICROSOFT	   BLOG	   (Mar.	   11,	   2011,	   8:00	   AM),	  http://blog.seattlepi.com/microsoft/2011/03/11/guest-­‐column-­‐microsoft-­‐software-­‐piracy-­‐bills-­‐would-­‐harm-­‐businesses.	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works	   that	   fall	   “within	   the	   subject	  matter	   of	   copyright.”179	   	   In	   fact,	   the	  Washington	  statute	  does	  neither.	  State	  laws	  are	  not	  subject	  to	  the	  Copyright	  Act	  preemption	  “if	  [extra]	  elements	   are	   required,	   instead	   of,	   or	   in	   addition	   to,	   the	   acts	   of	  reproduction,	  performance,	  distribution	  or	  display	  in	  order	  to	  constitute	  [the]	  state-­‐created	  cause	  of	  action.”180	   	  The	  Washington	  statute	  contains	  elements	   that	   are	   qualitatively	   different	   from,	   and	   in	   addition	   to,	  elements	   that	   must	   be	   satisfied	   in	   order	   to	   assert	   a	   copyright	  infringement	   claim.	   	   For	   example,	   no	   claim	   can	   be	   brought	   under	   the	  statute	  unless	   the	  products	   from	  the	  manufacturer	  using	  stolen	   IT	  were	  sold	  or	  offered	  for	  sale	  in	  Washington	  State	  in	  competition	  with	  products	  made	   without	   violating	   the	   prohibition.	   	   Moreover,	   only	   competing	  manufacturers	  (not	  IT	  owners)	  have	  standing	  to	  sue	  under	  the	  statute	  (in	  addition	  to	  the	  state	  attorney	  general),	  and	  the	  competing	  manufacturer	  must	   establish	   that	   it	   suffered	  economic	  harm.	   	  None	  of	   these	  elements	  are	  required	  to	  state	  a	  claim	  under	  the	  Copyright	  Act.	  The	  Washington	   statute	   is	   not	   vulnerable	   to	   preemption	   for	   a	  more	  basic	   reason:	   it	   does	   not	   regulate	   works	   that	   “come	  within	   the	   subject	  matter	  of	  copyright.”181	  	  The	  statute	  expressly	  excludes	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  article	  or	  product	  sold	  or	  offered	  for	  sale	  in	  the	  state	  “is	  a	  work	  within	  the	  subject	  matter	  of	  copyright	  as	  specified	  in	  section	  102	  of	  Title	  17,	  United	  States	  Code.”182	  	  Thus,	  if	  articles	  or	  products	  sold	  in	  Washington	  State	  fall	  within	   the	   scope	   of	   copyright,	   parties	   can	   continue	   to	   rely	   on	   the	  Copyright	  Act	   for	   relief.	   	   If	   articles	  or	  products	   fall	   outside	   the	   scope	  of	  copyright,	  however,	  and	  their	  sale	  in	  the	  state	  constitutes	  an	  unfair	  trade	  practice,	   the	   Washington	   statute	   will	   provide	   a	   remedy	   to	   injured	  manufacturers.	  It	   is	  perfectly	   reasonable	   for	   a	   state	   to	  pursue	  a	  policy	   that	   furthers	  the	  purposes	  of	  federal	  law	  (in	  terms	  of	  protecting	  the	  rights	  of	  property	  owners	   of	   IT)	   and	   condemns	   theft,	   so	   long	   as	   such	   actions	   are	   not	  preempted	  expressly	  or	  impliedly.	   	  Since	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  Washington	  statute	   is	   complementary	  with	  clearly	   stated	   federal	  goals	  and	  does	  not	  conflict	  with	  such	  goals,	  it	  is	  not	  preempted.	  
 179. 	  17	  U.S.C.	  §	  301(a)	  (2012).	  180. 	  Wrench	  LLC	  v.	  Taco	  Bell	  Corp.,	  256	  F.3d	  446,	  456	  (6th	  Cir.	  2001).	  	  As	  the	  author	  of	  a	  leading	  copyright	  treatise	  writes,	  “if	  qualitatively	  other	  elements	  are	  required,	  instead	  of,	  or	  in	   addition	   to,	   the	   acts	   of	   reproduction,	   performance,	   distribution,	   or	   display,	   in	   order	   to	  constitute	  a	  state-­‐created	  cause	  of	  action,	  then	  the	  right	  does	  not	  lie	  ‘within	  the	  general	  scope	  of	  copyright,’	  and	  there	  is	  no	  pre-­‐emption.”	  1	  MELVILLE	  B.	  NIMMER	  &	  DAVID	  NIMMER,	  NIMMER	  ON	  COPYRIGHT	  §	  1.01[B][1]	  (Matthew	  Bender,	  Rev.	  Ed.)	  (footnotes	  omitted).	  181. 	  17	  U.S.C.	  §	  301(a).	  182. 	  WASH.	  REV.	  CODE	  ANN.	  §§	  19.330.030,	  19.330.010(2).	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There	   are	   also	   powerful	   federalism	   policies	   in	   play	   when	   a	   state	  exercises	  the	  power	  to	  protect	  the	  property	  interests	  of	  its	  citizens.	   	  For	  example,	   “the	  U.S.	   system	  of	   antitrust	   federalism	  sometimes	  means	   that	  state	   sovereignty	   will	   defeat	   attempts	   to	   establish	   a	   uniform,	   national	  policy	   on	  how	  best	   to	   redress	   competitive	   harm.”183	   	   Even	   in	   situations	  where	   the	   state	   statute	   has	   an	   arguably	   suppressive	   effect	   on	  unrestrained	  price	  competition,	  the	  Court	  has	  allowed	  states	  to	  engage	  in	  precisely	   such	   activity	   so	   long	   as	   the	   policy	   is	   “clearly	   articulated	  .	  .	  .	  affirmatively	   expressed	  .	  .	  .	   [and]	   ‘actively	   supervised’	   by	   the	   State.”184	  	  The	  Washington	  statute	  falls	  squarely	  within	  those	  criteria.	  
B.	  	  	   Fairness	  in	  Price	  Competition	  In	  some	  cases,	  goods	  made	  by	  manufacturers	  using	  stolen	   IT	  will	  be	  cheaper	   because	   the	   manufacturer’s	   cost	   basis	   is	   reduced	   by	   the	   theft.	  	  Why	  impose	  legal	  consequences	  when	  the	  consumer	  is	  getting	  a	  product	  at	  a	  reduced	  price?	  	  The	  answer	  lies,	  in	  part,	  with	  the	  fundamental	  values	  at	   stake.	  	   Although	   hard-­‐core	   Chicago-­‐School	   devotees	   can	   argue	   that	  consumers	  are	  benefiting	  from	  the	  lower	  price,	  the	  consequences	  of	  this	  kind	   of	   price	   myopia	   are	   unacceptable.185	   	   A	   focus	   limited	   to	   reduced	  prices	  fails	  to	  take	  into	  account	  an	  array	  of	  values	  and	  incentives,	  not	  the	  least	  of	  which	  is	  stimulation	  of	  creativity	  and	  invention.	   	  The	  short-­‐term	  benefits	  for	  consumers	  who	  pay	  less	  are	  more	  than	  offset	  by	  the	  longer-­‐term	   adverse	   effects	   in	   terms	   of	   reduced	   competition	   and	   the	   adverse	  impact	  on	  creation	  and	  invention	  of	  better	  goods.	  As	   an	   economics	   matter,	   there	   is	   a	   long-­‐term	   and	   real	   risk	   in	   the	  failure	  to	  provide	  a	  regime	  to	  insure	  the	  protection	  of	  revenue,	  income,	  or	  royalties	   for	   intellectual	   property	   or	   IT.	  	   Talking	   about	   economic	  regulation	   and	   antitrust	   enforcement,	   Professor	   Thomas	   Horton	   posits	  that	  “[i]t	   is	   time	  to	  stop	  accepting	   Judge	  Bork’s	  Antitrust	  Paradox	   thesis.	  	  
 183. 	   Leon	   B.	   Greenfiled	  &	  William	   J.	   Kolasky,	   Antitrust	  Modernization:	   Picking	   Up	   the	  
European	  Gauntlet?,	  22	  ANTITRUST	  56,	  58	  (2008).	  184. 	  California	  Retail	  Liquor	  Dealers	  Ass’n.	  v.	  Midcal	  Aluminum,	   Inc.,	  445	  U.S.	  97,	  105	  (1980)	  (citation	  omitted).	  	  See	  FTC	  v.	  Ticor	  Title	  Ins.	  Co.,	  504	  U.S.	  621,	  633	  (1992)	  (“Actual	  state	  involvement,	  not	  deference	  to	  private	  price-­‐fixing	  arrangements	  under	  the	  general	  auspices	  of	  state	   law,	   is	  the	  precondition	  for	   immunity	  from	  federal	   law.”);	  see	  also	  Parker	  v.	  Brown,	  317	  U.S.	   341,	  351	   (1943)	   (“In	  a	  dual	   system	  of	   government	   in	  which,	  under	   the	  Constitution,	   the	  states	  are	  sovereign,	  save	  only	  as	  Congress	  may	  constitutionally	  subtract	  from	  their	  authority,	  an	  unexpressed	  purpose	  to	  nullify	  a	  state’s	  control	  over	  its	  officers	  and	  agents	  is	  not	  lightly	  to	  be	  attributed	  to	  Congress.”).	  185. 	  Thomas	  J.	  Horton,	  The	  Coming	  Extinction	  of	  Homo	  Economicus	  and	  the	  Eclipse	  of	  the	  
Chicago	  School	  of	  Antitrust:	  Applying	  Evolutionary	  Biology	  to	  Structural	  and	  Behavioral	  Antitrust	  
Analyses,	  42	  LOY.	  U.	  CHI.	  L.J.	  469,	  473–74	  (2011)	  [finding	  fairness,	  economic	  morality,	  and	  broad	  values,	  more	   than	   efficiency-­‐based	   (or	   so-­‐called	   Chicago-­‐School	   economics	   and	   a	   fixation	   on	  price)	  are	  fundamental	  to	  human	  beings	  and	  essential	  for	  survival].	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[W]e	   should	   focus	   on	   fair	   and	   ethical	   competition,	   which	  will	   enhance,	  rather	   than	   sacrifice,	   our	   economic	   system’s	   overall	   dynamic	   and	  adaptive	  efficiency.”186	  Professor	  Horton’s	  argument	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  leveling	  the	   playing	   field.	  	   He	   relies	   on	   one	   of	   the	   primary	   architects	   of	  deregulation,	   the	   late	  Professor	  Alfred	  Kahn,	  as	  support	   for	   the	  value	  of	  fairness	   in	   the	   competitive	   market.	  	   “[F]air	   competition	   is	   an	   ‘end	   in	  itself’	  .	  .	  .	  linked	  with	  the	  noneconomic	  values	  of	  free	  enterprise—equality	  of	   opportunity,	   [and]	   the	   channeling	   of	   the	   profit	   motive	   into	   social	  constructive	  channels.”187	  The	  notion	  that	  the	  legal	  system	  should	  tolerate	  an	  evolving	  segment	  of	   the	   culture	   that	   accepts	   theft	   is	   nonsensical.	  	   “[M]oral	   behavior	   is	  necessary	   for	   exchange	   in	   moderately	   regulated	   markets	  .	  .	  .	   to	   reduce	  cheating	   without	   exorbitant	   transaction	   costs.”188	   	   Professor	   Horton’s	  very	   recent	   scholarship	   on	   these	   points	   relies	   on	   Adam	   Smith	   for	   the	  proposition	  that	  competitive	  regimes	  and	  antitrust	  enforcement	  “should	  not	   be	   based	   solely	   on	   economic	  measurements	   but	   also	   on	  moral	   and	  political	  judgment.”189	  Turning	  an	  unseeing	  eye	  to	  IT	  theft	   ignores	  essential	  morality	  issues	  and	  fosters	  the	  notion,	  immortalized	  in	  our	  cinematic	  culture	  that	  “greed	  is	   good,	   greed	   simplifies,	   greed	   clarifies,	   greed	   in	   all	   of	   its	   forms	  makes	  the	  marketplace	  work.”190	  The	  idea	  of	  morality	  in	  the	  competitive	  market,	  including	  taking	  steps	  to	   level	   the	   playing	   field,	   is	   squarely	   in	   line	   with	   deep-­‐seated	   and	  fundamental	   values	   that	   transcend	   the	   simplistic	   notion	   of	   allocative	  efficiency.191	   	   A	   morally	   sound	   market	   is	   dynamic;	   in	   fact,	   it	   is	   the	  foundation	  of	  not	   just	  efficient	  market	  theory	  but	   is	   the	  “glue	  that	  holds	  our	  societies	  together.”192	   VI.	  	  	  CONCLUSION	  The	   theft	  of	   	   IT	  or	  other	  non-­‐tangible	  assets	  by	  upstream	  producers	  has	   a	   pernicious	   effect	   on	   fair	   market	   pricing,	   violates	   a	   most	  
 186. 	  Id.	  at	  502.	  187. 	  Id.	  (quoting	  Alfred	  E.	  Kahn,	  Standards	  for	  Antitrust	  Policy,	  in	  MONOPOLY	  POWER	  AND	  ECONOMIC	  PERFORMANCE:	  THE	  PROBLEM	  OF	  INDUSTRIAL	  CONCENTRATION	  151–52	  (1978)).	  188. 	  Id.	  at	  511.	  189. 	  Id.	  at	  512	  (citing	  Richard	  Hofstadter,	  What	  Happened	  to	  the	  Antitrust	  Movement,	  in	  THE	  BUSINESS	  ESTABLISHMENT	  113,	  149	  (Earl	  Frank	  Cheit	  ed.,	  1964)	  (focusing	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  moral	  force	  in	  antitrust	  enforcement).	  190. 	  WALL	  STREET	  (20th	  Century	  Fox	  1987).	  	  191. 	  Horton,	  supra	  note	  185,	  at	  506–07.	  192. 	  Id.	  at	  511.	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fundamental	   policy	   of	   intellectual	   property	   (protection	   of	   those	   who	  create	   and	   invent	   such	   property),	   and	   violates	   clear	   ethical	   norms	  regarding	   the	   sale	   of	   goods	   that	   benefitted	   from	   stolen	   IT	   or	   trade	  secrets.193	   	   This	   is	   particularly	   true	   in	   light	   of	   the	   current	   uncertainty	  surrounding	   non-­‐tangible	   technology	   patents.	   	   Thus,	   it	   makes	   solid	  economic	   sense	   to	   develop	   a	   plan	   to	   address	   such	   theft	   with	   multiple	  enforcement	  mechanisms.	  Much	   of	   this	   paper	   is	   focused	   on	   manufacturers	   and	   hiring	   firms	  benefitting	  from	  theft	  or	  misappropriation	  of	  property.	  	  These	  companies	  are	   free-­‐riding	  on	   the	   successes	   of	   creators	   and	   inventors,	   destabilizing	  the	  pricing	  market,	  and	  distorting	  lawful	  competition.	  The	   harm	   to	   competition	   and	   consumers	   is	   documented	   and	  substantial,	   public	   policy	   is	   implicated	   (in	   terms	   of	   both	   the	   letter	   and	  spirit	  of	   the	   laws	  regarding	  the	  use	  of	  stolen	  IT),	   fairness	   issues	  abound	  (regarding	   the	   injury	   suffered	   by	   those	   who	   produce	   the	   ideas	   and	  inventions	  that	  drive	  the	  economy),	  and	  unethical	  behavior	  (overt	  theft	  of	  IT)	  is	  rampant.	  Legislation	   is	   needed	   not	   just	   to	   stimulate	   creation	   and	   invention;	  state	   legislation,	   along	   the	   lines	   of	   the	  Washington	   statute	   discussed	   in	  this	  paper,	  holds	  out	  the	  promise	  of	  fairness	  in	  pricing,	  a	  level	  and	  vibrant	  competitive	  playing	   field,	  and	  some	  modicum	  of	   justice	   for	   those	  whose	  work	  has	  been	  stolen.	  
 193. 	   ELECTRONIC	   INDUSTRY	   CITIZENSHIP	   COALITION	   (EICC)	   CODE	   OF	   CONDUCT	   (2004)	  (Revised	  in	  2012),	  http://www.eicc.info/documents/EICCCodeofConductEnglish.pdf;	  for	  OECD	  information	   on	   theft	   or	   piracy	   of	   IT,	   see	  Magnitude	   of	   Counterfeiting	   and	   Piracy	   of	   Tangible	  
Products:	   An	   Update,	   OECD	   (Nov.	   2009),	  http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/27/44088872.pdf.	  
